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High quality financial reporting is critically important for bank regulation, 
particularly market discipline, but limited evidence exists on why banks provide different 
levels of financial reporting quality. I examine whether institutional investors and financial 
analysts impact bank financial reporting quality. Although I find no impact of analysts on 
bank financial reporting quality, institutional ownership is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality, and this relation is strongest for banks with high information 
asymmetry and for “monitoring” institutional investors. Institutional investors also sell 
shares following the announcement of a restatement, suggesting they are willing to use the 
threat of exit as a mechanism to influence bank managers and demand financial reporting 
quality. Finally, I find institutional investors demand financial reporting quality primarily 
for high risk banks and also reduce ex-ante bank risk and ex-post non-performing loans. 
Collectively, these results suggest institutional investors are an important component of 
bank governance.  
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“In the light of recent events, it is hard to dispute that high quality financial reporting is 
essential for the efficiency and stability of the financial systems. It is the cornerstone on 
which market discipline - a key theme of this conference - rests. But it is a subject that has 
regrettably not commanded the attention it deserves among researchers…. We need more 
and better analytical and empirical work. What is the best way to define and articulate the 
information needed for markets to function effectively? What mechanisms can best ensure 
that that information is indeed supplied? Answers to these questions are critical for better 
policy. We, as policy makers, will be eagerly awaiting them.”  
– Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, 2002 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Regulators have called for enhanced market discipline to promote the safety and 
soundness of the banking system (Bliss and Flannery, 2001). Market discipline incentivizes 
banks to make good decisions and minimize risk, but it is not possible without high quality 
financial reporting (BIS, 2001; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], 1983). 
Bank regulators also directly benefit from high quality financial reporting separate from 
the benefits of market discipline (BIS, 2008; Plosser, 2014). 
High financial reporting quality reduces information asymmetry and improves the 
ability of regulators, auditors, and investors to monitor firm risks and decisions (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001). Given the role banks play in the economy, the opaqueness of their 
operations, and the role of financial reporting quality in bank regulation, bank financial 
reporting quality is arguably even more important. As a result, bank regulators stress the 
importance of bank financial reporting quality for the banking system and global economy 
(e.g., Chakrabarty, 2013; Crockett, 2002).  
2 
 
Due to the importance of bank financial reporting quality, it is critical to understand 
the determinants of why some banks provide relatively higher or lower levels of financial 
reporting quality, but it is a relatively unexplored area in academic research (see Beatty 
and Liao, 2014 for a recent review paper on bank financial reporting quality). I examine 
the impact of the two main market information intermediaries that might be expected to 
impact the level of financial reporting quality provided by bank managers: institutional 
investors and financial analysts. Regulators recognize that only sophisticated market 
participants possess the analytical skills needed to evaluate and impact bank financial 
information and provide market discipline (FDIC, 1983). Given the perceived benefits of 
financial reporting quality, these market participants may demand, and ultimately improve, 
bank financial reporting quality. 
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are numerous reasons institutional investors 
and financial analysts may not improve or may even reduce bank financial reporting quality 
due to the differences between banks and non-financial firms. Firstly, it is unclear if even 
“sophisticated” market participants are able to understand and influence bank financial 
reporting quality due to the complexity of bank operations and the opaqueness of their 
assets (FDIC, 1983; Greenspan, 2008). Consistent with not understanding this complexity, 
sophisticated market participants have been criticized for not providing market discipline 
and failing to predict, or even contributing to, the financial crisis (e.g., Desai et al, 2015; 
Greenspan, 2013; Hawley et al., 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Additionally, bank 
regulation and market discipline may be substitutes rather than complements (Flannery, 
1998). That is, institutional investors and financial analysts may lack the incentive to 
demand high financial reporting quality if they believe regulators will already do so 
through the supervisory review process. 
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Moreover, regulators limit the amount of equity an institutional investor can acquire 
in a bank and their ability to communicate with bank management due to concerns they 
may increase risk (DLA Piper, 2010; Federal Reserve Board, 2008). Even regulators 
acknowledge these restrictions reduce institutional investors’ economic incentives and 
ability to influence bank management and decrease bank monitoring (Adams and Mehran, 
2003; Prowse, 1997).  
Furthermore, several recent theoretical papers argue a unique cost of financial 
reporting quality in the banking industry whereby they note that banks may be “optimally 
opaque” due to banks’ role in producing money and providing liquidity to the economy 
(Dang et al., 2013; Dang et al., 2014; Monnet and Quintin, 2014). An implication of this 
stream of research is that efforts to increase bank transparency can adversely impact the 
economy and bank profitability. As a result, institutional investors in particular may 
actually prefer lower financial reporting quality if they believe the net impact of such 
reporting will reduce the value of their bank investments. As summarized by Bushman 
(2014), “this literature finds that while credible public information about individual banks 
can enhance the ability of regulators and market participants to monitor and exert discipline 
on banks’ behavior, there are also endogenous costs associated with transparency that can 
be detrimental to the banking system.” Moreover, institutional investors and financial 
analysts may discourage increased bank transparency if they have access to private 
information from firms (Ajinkya et al., 2005). In short, it is an empirical question whether 
institutional investors and financial analysts demand and improve bank financial reporting 
quality. 
I first examine whether institutional investors and financial analysts impact the loan 
loss provision, the single most important banking accrual, and its ability to predict future 
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loan charge-offs. I also examine two broad measures of financial reporting quality: 
earnings persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows. Collectively, 
these earnings attributes improve the ability of market participants to understand banks’ 
future risk and performance, which should be particularly important to engage in market 
discipline. Due to the nature of my tests, I perform my analysis using residual institutional 
ownership and analyst following, calculated as residuals from cross-sectional regressions 
on their economic determinants.  
Using a large sample of bank holding companies from 1990-2011, I find residual 
institutional ownership is positively associated with all three measures of financial 
reporting quality. In cross-sectional tests, I find this positive association is strongest for 
banks with higher information asymmetry, consistent with institutional investors 
demanding higher financial reporting quality where direct monitoring is more difficult. In 
contrast, I find no statistical relation between residual analyst following and financial 
reporting quality.  
I acknowledge the positive relation between residual institutional ownership and 
financial reporting quality could be endogenous. That is, banks with higher financial 
reporting quality may attract institutional investors or other factors simultaneously both 
attract institutions and improve financial reporting. I perform several analyses to help rule 
out these alternative explanations. I control for residual institutional ownership at the end 
of the current and following years and find that financial reporting quality is only positive 
and significantly related to residual institutional ownership at the start of the year. 
Additionally, changes analyses show an increase in residual institutional ownership 
explains future, but not past or current, improvements to financial reporting quality.  
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Furthermore, if the positive relation is due to institutional investors demanding 
improved financial reporting quality, the relation should be strongest where theory would 
predict it should be strongest. I first test for cross-sectional differences in the type of 
institutional investor and examine “monitoring” institutional investors. I define a 
monitoring institution as one that is both “dedicated” (Bushee, 2001) and “independent” 
(Brickley et al., 1988). These institutional investors have the most incentive and ability to 
demand financial reporting quality and provide market discipline due to their investment 
horizon and lack of potential conflicts of interest. I find that the positive relation between 
residual institutional ownership and financial reporting quality is driven by these 
institutions. I also examine time-series differences around the financial crisis where the 
demand for financial reporting quality by market participants was likely highest and most 
critical. I find the positive relation between residual institutional ownership and financial 
reporting quality is even stronger in the financial crisis for most of my measures of financial 
reporting quality.  
In additional analysis, I test one mechanism for institutional investors to influence 
bank managers: using the threat of selling shares if a bank does not respond to demands for 
high financial reporting quality. The threat of exit by institutional investors can be a 
powerful governance mechanism if managers believe the threat is credible (Bharath et al., 
2013). Using a restatement announcement as a shock to perceived financial reporting 
quality, I test whether institutional investors are willing to “vote with their feet” and exit 
the bank’s stock. I find total raw institutional ownership decreases after the announcement 
relative to a matched sample. This decrease is most significant for monitoring institutions. 
As a result, bank managers would likely be responsive to institutional investors’ ex ante 
demands for financial reporting quality. 
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I also examine whether institutional investors reduce earnings management and 
also demand more information, as opposed to improving the quality of existing 
information, by examining banks’ voluntary disclosure. I find residual institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with earnings management and positively associated 
with the decision to provide management earnings forecasts. I also examine the role of 
auditors and audit quality on bank financial reporting quality and find no evidence that 
higher quality audits also improve financial reporting quality.  
Finally, given institutional investors demand high quality financial reporting, I 
examine the relation between their demand for high quality financial information and bank 
risk and whether institutional investors appear to engage in market discipline and impact 
bank risk. I find the positive relation between residual institutional ownership and financial 
reporting quality is strongest for high risk banks, consistent with financial information 
being most useful for banks where market discipline is also most critical. I then find 
residual institutional ownership is negatively associated with a common measure of ex-
ante bank risk and future non-performing loans using both levels and changes 
specifications. These final tests provide the most direct evidence that institutional investors 
do engage in market discipline and use of the financial statements appears to be one of the 
main channels for this discipline. 
This study makes several contributions. Evidence on the impact of institutional 
investors and financial analysts on bank financial reporting quality should be informative 
to regulators, auditors, investors, and standard setters given the importance of bank 
financial reporting. These findings also contribute to research on the impact of institutional 
investors and analysts on financial reporting quality for non-banks (e.g., Cornett et al., 
2008; Yu, 2008). Additionally, the fact that I find different results from prior non-banking 
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literature for analysts (see Yu, 2008) provides more evidence that bank governance 
mechanisms are simply different from non-banks, and these differences need to be 
carefully considered by researchers (Becht et al., 2011a).  
More generally, these findings contribute to the growing literature on bank financial 
reporting quality by extending knowledge of the economic forces that impact it. Beatty and 
Liao (2014) conclude there is relatively little evidence about how banks’ governance 
mechanisms interact with regulation to shape financial reporting. Evidence that 
institutional investors are an important component of bank governance and documenting 
one mechanism by which they appear to influence financial reporting contributes to this 
void. Finally, coupled with the evidence that institutional investors also appear to decrease 
bank risk, these findings help validate regulators’ emphasis on market discipline using 
public bank financial information.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background 
and theory development. Chapter 3 presents the sample construction and research design. 




Chapter 2: Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 MARKET DISCIPLINE AND BANK FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
Regulators are increasingly interested in using outside investors to engage in market 
discipline to impact banks and accomplish regulatory objectives (Greenspan, 2001; 
Plossner, 2014). The notion that the market’s disciplinary forces can support the regulatory 
goals of safety and soundness is based on the belief that the market can identify a bank’s 
“true condition” quite well (Bliss and Flannery, 2001).1 The intuition for how market 
discipline works is summarized by the FDIC (1983, IV-2) in a Congressional report as 
follows:  
If the market’s general consensus regarding the condition of a particular bank 
causes it to seek an inordinately large risk premium or to withdraw from existing 
business relationships with the institution, the bank’s cost of doing business will 
increase and its ability to continue as an operating enterprise may be reduced. 
To ensure that it remains viable, the bank’s expected response to such a situation 
would be to strive to restore its financial condition to a more acceptable level 
and to temper those managerial policies responsible for its increased risk.  
Even at the time of the FDIC’s report to Congress in 1983, banks had grown so 
complex that regulators acknowledged there were only two paths that regulators could 
pursue to attempt to effectively regulate banks and limit excessive risk taking: (a) 
“promulgate countless new regulations governing every aspect of bank behavior and hire 
                                                 
1 The implicit assumption underlying the use of market discipline for bank regulation is that banking 
problems are predominantly idiosyncratic and associated with principal-agent frictions due to information 
asymmetry and incomplete contracting that generate moral hazard and can ultimately lead to excessively 
risky behavior. Market discipline aligns the incentives of bank managers with the incentives of market 
participants, allowing them to discipline and influence bank behavior. The role of market discipline at 
mitigating systematic risk is less clear (Stephanou, 2010). 
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thousands of additional examiners to enforce them” or (b) “seeking ways to impose a 
greater degree of marketplace discipline on the system to replace outmoded government 
controls” (FDIC, 1983, foreword). The FDIC concluded the first approach “would 
ultimately fail,” and chose the latter approach to mobilize the resources of the market. 
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan (2001), echoed these comments 
and stated, “We need to adopt policies that promote private counterparty supervision as the 
first line of defense for a safe and sound banking system. Uninsured counterparties must 
price higher or simply not deal with banking organizations that take on excessive risk.”  
The emphasis on market discipline by banking regulators has only increased over 
time (Kwan, 2004). To that end, Basel II, the international bank regulatory framework, 
introduced market discipline as one of three complementary pillars of effective bank 
regulation, along with minimal capital requirements and the supervisory review process. 
Each of these pillars is mutually reinforcing and critical to have a safe financial system 
(BIS, 2001). The importance of market discipline has not only been reaffirmed in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis but further emphasized in the recently finalized Basel III 
regulatory framework (BIS, 2011).  
However, market discipline is not possible without high quality financial 
information (e.g., BIS, 2008; Chakrabarty, 2013; McDonough, 2001). In particular, the 
market needs information about banks’ condition, performance, and risk to determine 
future credit risk and earnings potential (FDIC, 1983; Jalan, 2002). As summarized by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (1991, 5): “The key to successful bank 
regulation is knowing what banks are really worth.”2 Expanding on this, Alan Greenspan 
(2001) noted, “Counterparties need information on which to make informed decisions 
                                                 
2 The Government Accountability Office was formerly known as the General Accounting Office until 2004. 
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about the riskiness of bank claims… But the quantity and quality of such disclosure is 
uneven and all entities could, should, and may soon be required to disclose more and better 
data” (emphasis added).  
Financial reporting serves an important role as a governance mechanism that 
promotes efficient operations of the firm. High financial reporting quality better reflects 
the underlying economics of the firm and can help managers and investors better identify 
good and bad investments, discipline managers to make good decisions, and reduce 
information asymmetry (Bushman and Smith, 2001). For example, higher financial 
reporting quality improves the ability of outsiders to monitor non-financial firms and 
improves performance as a result (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle et al., 2009; and 
Hope and Thomas, 2008). Recent empirical bank research is also consistent with more 
transparent accounting enabling market discipline and resulting in lower risk (Bushman 
and Williams, 2012). Bushman and Williams (2012) use a cross-country setting and 
document that more forward-looking loan loss provisions improves bank risk-shifting, 
consistent with high financial reporting quality better facilitating market discipline. 
However, Bushman and Williams (2012) do not provide evidence on why within a given 
country, some banks provide relatively higher or lower levels of financial reporting quality. 
Beyond market discipline, bank regulators also directly benefit from high quality 
financial statements. High quality financial reporting “improves the quality of information 
relied on by banking supervisors” (BIS, 2008, 2). For example, key components that are 
reported in the financial statements, such as the loan loss provision, are important for 
determining regulatory capital (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Additionally, financial statement 
information has assumed a greater role in the regulatory supervisory process because bank 
regulators use this information to conduct more in-depth and timely assessments of 
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emerging bank risk, such as the stress tests required by the Dodd-Frank Act (FDIC, 1983; 
Plosser, 2014). 
As a result, bank regulators stress the importance of high quality financial reporting 
(e.g., Chakrabarty, 2013; Crockett, 2002; Knight, 2003; Mishkin, 2007). In fact, regulators 
have noted a paucity of research in the area and explicitly requested academic research on 
what financial information is needed by the market and how to ensure banks will provide 
high quality financial information (e.g., Crockett, 2002). This paper helps contribute to this 
void. 
2.2 INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES 
Given high quality financial reporting is crucial for market discipline, it is an 
empirical question whether market participants will demand it and how they will impact it. 
However, integral to whether or not market participants will seek out high quality bank 
information is whether or not market participants have the willingness and ability to 
understand it. Bank regulators admit banks are too complex for the general public to have 
the analytical and financial analysis skills necessary to understand bank financial 
information. As such, only sophisticated users, such as institutional investors and analysts, 
may have the ability to understand and demand bank financial reporting and ultimately 
provide market discipline (FDIC, 1983).3 Consistent with this, academic research generally 
                                                 
3 Much of the non-financial literature focuses on the monitoring and discipline performed by creditors (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2004; Beatty et al., 2010). However, one of the main ways that banks are distinct from non-
banks is that banks are largely financed by short-term debt, particularly deposits (Tracy, 2013). These 
creditors are unlikely to monitor the bank and provide market discipline, which is the very reason that 
policymakers over time have considered requiring at least the largest banks to have some subordinated debt; 
in fact, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act required most of the largest banks to issue some investment-grade debt 
(Lang and Robertson, 2002). In recent work, Jayaraman and Thakor (2013) develop an analytical model on 
capital structure and bank monitoring and show both analytically and empirically that the main source of 
bank monitoring comes from equity holders. 
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considers institutional investors and financial analysts to be the main market information 
intermediaries (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004).  
Both by the nature of their large investments and sophistication, institutional 
investors have the ability and incentive to scrutinize, monitor, and influence firms (e.g., 
Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).4 In many cases, 
institutional investors have been found to be successful activists for public companies with 
a recent article referring to them as “capitalism’s unlikely heroes” (The Economist, 2015). 
Consistent with this, Hawley et al. (2011, 4) note that a core concept of governance 
advocated by institutional investors is that “transparency is critical to accountability, which 
in turn is critical to a well-governed firm in relation to its owners.”5  
Prior research on institutional investors and financial reporting quality has 
generally excluded banks from their samples and results are mixed. The majority of papers 
show that institutional investors help financial reporting quality, generally measured using 
discretionary accruals. For example, Cornett et al. (2008) and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(1997) find a negative relation between total institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals. Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find a positive relation between dedicated and 
independent institutional investors and conservatism. However, Burns et al. (2010) find 
that institutional ownership is positively associated with restatements. Matsumoto (2002) 
                                                 
4 In contrast, small investors frequently trade for non-information related reasons such as liquidity, 
speculation, or news attention (Barber and Odean, 2000, 2008; Odean, 1999), and therefore, it is unlikely 
that they will impact financial reporting quality nor provide the market discipline desired by bank regulators. 
5 That said, Hawley et al. (2011, 4) allege institutional investors did not demand enough financial information 
transparency in the financial sector during the Financial Crisis, saying, “Transparency, accountability, and 
good governance generally add value. Lack of these was toxic.” 
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finds that firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to meet or exceed 
earnings expectations and results are driven by transient investors.6 7 
Financial analysts also act as monitors of firms (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Analysts review financial statements on a regular basis (Yu, 2008), 
have been directly involved in the discovery of accounting fraud (Dyck et al. 2010), and 
have a comparative advantage over other market participants in understanding industry and 
market trends (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004).  
Limited research examines the impact of analysts on financial reporting quality. Yu 
(2008) excludes banks from his sample and finds analyst coverage is negatively related 
with discretionary accruals and narrowly meeting earnings targets, suggesting analysts 
directly improve financial reporting quality. However, analysts have also been argued to 
exert pressure on firms, with the analyst consensus forecast being one of the main earnings 
targets firms try to achieve (Degeorge et al., 1999). Analysts also have incentives to curry 
favor with management for access and to generate underwriting commissions (Brown et 
al., 2014; Dechow et al., 2000; Gu and Xue, 2008) although these incentives have likely 
decreased after Regulation Fair Disclosure (Bushee et al., 2004). Additionally, survey 
evidence indicates many analysts take the financial statements at “face value,” which casts 
                                                 
6 In related research, institutional investors may trade extensively based on current earnings and place 
excessive emphasis on short-term performance (e.g., Bushee, 1998, 2001; Yan and Zhang, 2009). 
7 Concerns that any negative impact on financial reporting from the short-term focus of many institutional 
investors could dominate any positive impact from other institutions such that on average institutional 
investors have a negative impact are uniquely salient in the banking industry. Elyasiani and Jia (2008) note 
ownership restrictions may disproportionately reduce the number of monitoring institutions willing to invest 
in banks. Maug (1998) analytically shows part of the incentive to monitor comes from the ability to purchase 
additional shares at a price that does not reflect the anticipated ex-post improvements. Because the ability to 
acquire additional shares in banks is limited by ownership restrictions and may require regulator pre-
approval, which could result in increasing the stock price prior to the purchase, these regulations my 
disproportionately limit the interest that dedicated institutions have in acquiring bank stock (Elyasiani and 
Jia, 2008). Consistent with this prediction, total dedicated institutional investor ownership comprises 21.2% 
of the total institutional ownership in D’Souza et al. (2010, Table 2, Panel A), using essentially the entire 
Compustat sample (including banks), versus 11.7% in my sample of banks (untabulated). 
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doubt on how much analysts will scrutinize and demand improvements to financial 
reporting (Brown et al., 2014). Finally, specific to banks, Desai et al. (2015) finds that 
analysts did not appear to understand early distress signals in bank financial statements 
prior to the financial crisis. 
Given the benefits of financial reporting quality, if institutional investors and 
financial analysts engage in market discipline, one may expect they should demand it. 
Managers are likely to be receptive to these demands when they set their earnings 
recognition and financial reporting policies because financial executives view institutional 
investors, followed by financial analysts, as the most important marginal price setters of 
their stock.8 9 
2.3 UNIQUE BANKING FEATURES 
However, there are numerous reasons institutional investors and financial analysts 
may not demand high quality financial reporting and why these results may be unique in 
the banking industry. Becht et al. (2011a, 437) note that the distinct features of banks 
present unique challenges to researchers and argue that “bank governance is different and 
requires more radical departures from traditional governance for non-financial firms.” 
Firstly, it is unclear institutional investors and financial analysts are even able to effectively 
                                                 
8 Approximately 90% of the CFOs surveyed identify institutional investors or financial analysts as the most 
important price setter, with 54% (36%) ranking institutional investors (financial analysts) the most important 
price setter, respectively (Graham et al., 2005, Table 10).  
9 There are other external market participants that could provide market discipline, such as auditors, but I 
focus on institutional investors and financial analysts for parsimony since they are considered to be the two 
main information intermediaries and are considered the most important external stakeholders at impacting 
the stock price by managers. That said, given the importance that bank regulators place on having a high 
quality external audit (see BIS, 2008, 2014), in Chapter 5.4, I also examine the impact of auditors on bank 
financial reporting quality. Some other papers have also examined the role of the credit rating agencies in the 
financial crisis in detail and generally find that they did not appear to forecast future bank difficulties (Desai 
et al., 2015) and made biased assumptions or even made knowingly inflated rankings that contributed to the 
crisis (Griffin and Tang, 2011; Griffin and Tang, 2012). As a result, I do not examine the credit rating 
agencies in this paper. 
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understand and influence bank financial reporting due to the complexity of bank operations 
and opaqueness of their assets. Due to this complexity, the FDIC (1983, IV-7) stated, 
“There are few, if any, institutions which so profoundly affect the public interest, but are 
so universally misunderstood, as banks.” 
Recent empirical evidence generally finds banks are more opaque with higher 
levels of information asymmetry than other industries (see Beatty and Liao, 2014).10 This 
underlying business complexity has resulted in bank financial information that is complex 
and difficult to understand (FDIC, 1983). One financial institution CFO confesses that 
“some of our own mandated footnotes… are so complex, even I don't understand them” 
(Graham et al., 2005, 58). This growing complexity has caused even regulators to grow 
concerned with their ability to monitor banks, and regulators have access to private 
information (Bliss and Flannery, 2001).  
Even prior to the financial crisis, regulators questioned how well even sophisticated 
market participants understood bank financial information, noting that some sophisticated 
users “are in fact no more knowledgeable than the general public” (FDIC, 1983, IV-5). 
Alan Greenspan (2008, 489) noted that the financial markets “have become too huge, 
complex, and fast-moving…. No wonder this globalized financial behemoth stretches 
beyond the full comprehension of even the most sophisticated market participants.” 
Consistent with these complexity concerns, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, both 
institutional investors and financial analysts have been criticized for not predicting, and 
                                                 
10 Morgan and Strioh (2001) argue increasing business complexity causes banks to have higher levels of 
information asymmetry, at least during uncertain economic environments. Flannery et al. (2004) argue bank 
loans are opaque and a source of value uncertainty because no one knows their true value. Most recently, 
Flannery et al. (2013) find banks have higher bid-ask spreads than non-financial firms in crisis periods. 
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potentially contributing to, the financial crisis due to their failure to identify future bank 
risk (Desai et al., 2015; Hawley et al., 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).  
Additionally, the relationship between bank regulation and market discipline may 
be substitutionary rather than complementary (e.g., Booth et al., 2002; Elyasiani and Jia, 
2008; Plosser, 2014). Banks are different than non-banks in many regards, and one of the 
main reasons for these differences is bank regulation. Somewhat surprisingly, we know 
relatively little about how banks’ governance mechanisms interact with regulation to shape 
financial reporting (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Booth et al. (2002) find traditional monitoring 
mechanisms are less critical for regulated firms since regulators are an alternative monitor. 
Similarly, Flannery (1998) and Llewellyn (2005) argue that regulatory monitoring 
decreases the incentives of outside market participants to monitor banks. As noted in 
Llewellyn (2005), particularly if market participants view bank regulators as having 
superior information, expertise, and economies of scale, the market may see little value in 
incurring monitoring costs themselves. As a result, institutional investors and financial 
analysts may lack incentive to demand high financial reporting quality given the belief that 
regulators will already do so in the supervisory review process, effectively the standard 
free-rider problem.  
Regulators also limit the amount of equity ownership that an institutional investor 
can acquire in a bank and limit its ability to communicate with and influence bank 
management (DLA Piper, 2010). The Bank Holding Company Act requires institutional 
investors that have “control” over a bank be regulated as a bank themselves, which would 
require them to reserve additional capital and restrict their activities (DLA Piper, 2010). 
The determination of control by regulators is subjective and can be triggered if the 
institutional investor “directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the 
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management or policies of the banking organization” (Federal Reserve Board, 2008, 1). 
Historically, the Federal Reserve has determined that an investment as low as 5% of the 
voting shares of a bank can create a presumption of control and has placed significant 
limitations on any investments that exceed this threshold (DLA Piper, 2010; Powell 
Goldstein, 2008). Not surprisingly, these limitations are considered a significant deterrent 
to large institutional investments in banks, particularly for smaller banks (Kaufman, 2011).  
To overcome this presumption of control, institutional investors are forced to either 
acquire small ownership interests beneath these thresholds or enter into passivity 
commitments with the Federal Reserve where they agree to, among other things, not have 
a representative on the Board of directors and not attempt to significantly influence the 
bank’s major policies and operations.11 As a result, most institutional investors structure 
their investments to have less than 5% of the stock and avoid showing any significant 
influence over bank management (DLA Piper, 2010).12 
The reason for these restrictions is a concern that outside investors and bank 
regulators have different fundamental objectives: profit maximization versus safety and 
soundness, respectively. As a result, regulators are concerned institutional investors may 
increase bank failures (Federal Reserve Board, 2008). However, a consequence of these 
restrictions is that institutional investor ownership levels in banks are significantly lower 
than non-financial firms and the banking industry has witnessed far fewer instances of 
                                                 
11 Bank regulators slightly loosened institutional ownership restrictions in late 2008 in an effort to entice 
private equity investment in troubled banks, but changes were considered minor and still significantly limit 
institutional investors’ ability to influence bank management (MacIntosh and Scholtes, 2008; Powell 
Goldstein, 2008). 
12 The Federal Reserve (2008, 12) describes this limited and passive role as follows, “To avoid the exercise 
of a controlling influence, in all cases, the decision whether or not to adopt a particular position or take a 
particular action must remain with the banking organization’s shareholders as a group, its board of directors, 
or its management, as appropriate. The role of the minority investor in these decisions must be limited to 
voting its shares in its discretion at a meeting of the shareholders of the banking organization….” 
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public shareholder activism (Adams and Mehran, 2003).13 Becht et al. (2011b) note that 
hedge-fund activism can be a powerful governance mechanism but is rarely targeted at 
banks. Prowse (1997), formerly staff at the Federal Reserve, and others argue these 
restrictions have the unintended consequence of decreasing bank monitoring because 
institutional investors will not own enough equity to make it worthwhile.  
Furthermore, while the discussion above presumes that institutional investors and 
analysts want high bank financial reporting quality but may lack the incentives or ability 
to demand and influence it, it is not universally acknowledged that bank transparency is a 
good thing. A growing area of the literature notes there are significant costs associated with 
the push, namely by regulators, for increased transparency, particularly for banks. Gorton 
(2013) discusses the evolution of the banking system from prior to the Civil War up to and 
including the financial crisis. He argues that regulators actually have shown a preference 
for reduced bank transparency, particularly in bad times, due to concerns it could cause a 
loss of confidence in the market, which could lead to panic selling and bank runs. To 
support his contention, he notes the ban on short selling for the largest banks during the 
financial crisis, despite evidence that short sellers are better able to use public information 
to make trades that improve the efficiency of stock prices (see Drake et al., 2011; Saffi and 
Sigurdsson, 2011).  
Consistent with Gorton’s claims, several recent analytical models demonstrate how 
bank’s role in producing money and providing liquidity to the economy is facilitated 
largely by their opacity (Dang et al., 2013; Dang et al., 2014; Monnet and Quintin, 2014). 
                                                 
13 Adams and Mehran (2003, 31), both staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, note that while there 
have been few documented cases of institutional investors taking a proactive role in bank governance, they 
may prefer to address governance issues with banks privately and argue that information on whether and how 
institutional investors influence banks “remains an important area for future research.” 
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To the extent that institutional investors in particular believe increased transparency will 
harm bank profitability and stock prices for these very reasons, they may not want high 
quality financial reporting since it would better reflect (and reveal) the underlying 
economics, risks, and decisions of the bank, inhibiting bank operations and loan and 
deposit growth.  
Another reason institutional investors and financial analysts may discourage 
increased bank transparency is because they have access to private information from the 
banks themselves. For example, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that concentrated and dedicated 
institutional investors prefer less transparency for non-financial firms because the investors 
are confident in their ability to understand the firm’s performance and risk through other 
channels such as private communication with management. While private communication 
between firm management and market participants has reduced post Reg-FD, it has not 
been eliminated for institutional investors nor for analysts (see. Ajinkya et al, 2005; Brown 
et al., 2014). In fact, given the opacity in bank financial statements, private information is 
even more valuable as it could allow institutional investors to earn an abnormal return and 
analysts to significantly reduce forecast errors. In short, it is an empirical question whether 
institutional investors and financial analysts demand and improve bank financial reporting 
quality. 
2.4 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether and how institutional investors and 
financial analysts impact bank financial reporting quality. This leads to my first hypothesis 
(in null form): 
H1: Institutional investors and financial analysts are not associated with bank 
financial reporting quality, ceteris paribas. 
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While the first hypothesis relates to all banks, different bank characteristics may 
both make market discipline more crucial and, at the same time, more difficult. As shown 
in Prendergast (2002), when information asymmetry between management and outside 
investors is higher, investors have less information about which actions managers should 
take. As a result, monitoring will be more difficult, making the financial statements even 
more crucial as a means to assess bank condition and engage in market discipline. Related 
to the discussion above on the potential benefits of bank opacity to market participants, 
banks with higher information asymmetry likely also have less private information 
available, increasing the need for reliance on the public financial statements. This leads to 
my second hypothesis (in null form): 
H2: The relation between institutional investors and financial analysts and 
financial reporting quality is equal for banks with higher and lower levels of 
information asymmetry, ceteris paribas.  
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Chapter 3: Sample and Research Design 
3.1 SAMPLE 
I use annual accounting data from the FR Y-9C reports from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago.
14
 I merge this data with CRSP using the link-table maintained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank to obtain stock return data necessary for my tests. Institutional 
investor ownership data is from the Thomson Reuters database which obtains institution 
holdings data from 13-F filings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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Following prior literature, if no institutional investors report holdings data for a bank year 
in my sample, I set the institutional investor ownership to be zero (Gompers and Metrick, 
2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004).
16
 Institutional investor classification data from 
Bushee (2001) is obtained from Brian Bushee’s website. Analyst data is obtained from 
I/B/E/S. Restatement data is obtained from Audit Analytics and begins in 2000. Auditor 
data is obtained from the FR Y-9C reports and supplemented with Compustat and beings 
in 2000. My main sample consists of 6,899 bank-years from 1990 – 2011 representing 845 
unique bank holding companies (hereafter referred to as “banks”) with available data for 
my tests.
17 The sample construction is summarized in Table 1, Panel A. 
                                                 
14 The FR Y-9C contains all balance sheet, income statement, and additional information and is mandated 
for all BHCs that meet certain size or other requirements (e.g., public debt or complex operations). From 
1990 through 2005, the asset-size threshold was $150 million which was increased in 2006 to $500 million. 
I use all bank-years in my sample with available data, but I obtain similar results if I omit bank years prior to 
2006 with assets less than $500 million to make the sample more comparable over time (untabulated). 
15 All institutional investors with more than $100 million securities under management must report quarterly 
holdings for all common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 (Gompers and Metrick, 
2001). 
16 I obtain similar results if I omit all bank-years with zero institutional investor holdings (untabulated). 
17 I omit non-traditional BHCs such as Goldman Sachs and American Express that converted into BHCs 




3.2 MEASURES OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND ANALYST FOLLOWING 
Prior research shows institutional ownership and analyst following are 
endogenously determined by firm and stock characteristics (Bhushan, 1989; Bushee, 2004; 
Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Hong et al., 2000). Because these firm characteristics may 
also impact financial reporting quality, this can confound my tests and result in a spurious 
relation. To mitigate these concerns, I need to control for these variables. I follow prior 
research and perform all of my analyses unless otherwise noted using a measure of the 
residual, rather than raw, ownership levels (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012) and analyst following (Clinton et al., 2014; Yu, 2008). 
That is, I regress the raw institutional ownership percentage or analyst following on firm 
characteristics that determine such ownership and following, respectively, and use the 
residuals in my analyses.
18 19 
The model for institutional ownership is based on Gompers and Metrick (2001) and 
uses the ten explanatory variables in their analysis to proxy for the three main investment 
characteristics of institutional ownership: (1) prudence, (2) liquidity, and (3) the historical 




                                                 
18 The intuition of interpreting the coefficient on the residual institutional investor or analyst variable in my 
analyses is similar to interpreting the coefficient on the raw variables in a multivariate setting with the 
determinants of institutional ownership and analyst following as additional controls. I use the residual 
variables namely because it is easier to interpret the results since my variables of interest are interaction terms 
(see Chapter 3.3). Nonetheless, results are similar if I use raw values and include all these determinants as 
additional covariates interacted with the variable of interest (untabulated). 
19 It should be emphasized that using this residual measure does not resolve the inherent identification issues 
surrounding using institutional ownership and analyst following. In Chapter 4.4, I discuss additional analyses 
I perform to help mitigate concerns of alternative explanations for my results, namely simultaneity and 
reverse causation explanations.  
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OWNi,t = 0 + 1BMi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t + 3VOLATILITYi,t + 4TURNOVERi,t +  
5STOCKPRICEi,t + 6SP500i,t + 7MOMENTUM3i,t + 8MOMENTUM12i,t + 
9AGEi,t + 10YIELDi,t-1 + εi,t                                                 (1) 
where OWNi,t - raw percentage ownership of bank i at the end of year t held by total 
institutional investors; BMi,t - book to market ratio of bank i at the end of year t calculated 
as the book value of the total common equity divided by the market value of common 
equity; SIZEi,t - natural log of total assets in millions of bank i at the end of year t; 
VOLATILITYi,t - variance of monthly stock returns of bank i from the beginning of year 
t-1 to the end of year t; TURNOVERi,t - total monthly volume of bank i common equity 
divided by total common shares outstanding measured three months prior to the end of year 
t; STOCKPRICEi,t - common equity stock price of bank i at of the end of year t; SP500i,t - 
S&P 500 dummy variable equal to one if bank i is included in the S&P 500 index at the 
end of year t and set to zero otherwise; MOMENTUM3i,t - total gross buy and hold stock 
return of bank i during the last three months of year t; MOMENTUM12i,t - total gross buy 
and hold stock return of bank i during the nine month period beginning at the start of year 
t and ending three months prior to the end of year t; AGEi,t - natural log of bank age 
calculated as the number of years bank i has been listed on CRSP at of the end of year t; 
YIELDi,t - total declared cash dividends of bank i during year t scaled by the market value 
of common equity at the beginning of year t. The prudence motive is captured by 
VOLATILITYi,t, SP500i,t, AGEi,t, and YIELDi,t; the liquidity motive is captured by SIZEi,t, 
TURNOVERi,t, and STOCKPRICEi,t; and the historical return motive is captured by 
SIZEi,t, BMi,t, MOMENTUM3i,t, and MOMENTUM12i,t. 
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results of estimating Equation (1) for total 
institutional ownership in banks. Consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001) for non-
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financial firms, BMi,t, SIZEi,t, TURNOVERi,t, STOCKPRICEi,t, and AGEi,t are positively 
associated with total bank institutional ownership, while YIELDi,t is negatively associated. 
In contrast with prior literature, SP500i,t is negatively associated with total bank 
institutional ownership and MOMENTUM3i,t and MOMENTUM12i,t are positively 
associated. This provides some initial evidence that while many of the determinants of 
institutional ownership for banks work similarly to investment in non-banks, there may be 
differences in the investment strategies or average institutional owners for banks.20 The 
model has good explanatory power (R2 = 0.47) similar to that reported in prior literature 
(Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). 
My model for analyst following is based on Hong et al. (2000) who find analyst 
following is almost exclusively determined by size.
21
 I estimate the following regression 
annually using OLS: 
LNANALYSTi,t = 0 + 1SIZEi,t + εi,t                          (2) 
                                                 
20 While the negative coefficient on SP500i,t in particular is surprising, it is important to remember the nature 
of a multivariate regression. For example, when OWNi,t is regressed only on SP500i,t, as expected the 
coefficient on SP500i,t is positive and significant (t = 23.94). However, SP500i,t also has a large positive 
correlation with SIZEi,t (0.62) and AGEi,t (0.47), so simply adding those two variables to the regression 
changes the coefficient on SP500i,t to negative and significant (t = -3.37) (untabulated). That said, the very 
fact that controlling for all those other factors, index inclusion is negatively associated with institutional 
ownership provides further evidence that institutional investors may behave differently for bank investments 
and could be the subject of future research. For example, it appears that institutional investors on average 
invest in larger banks that are not members of the S&P 500 than they invest in smaller banks that are members 
of the S&P 500. 
21 Most other papers that calculate residual analyst coverage similarly regress analyst following on size (e.g., 
Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2010; Clinton et al., 2014). However, I obtain similar results if I use the model 
in Yu (2008), which includes additional controls (untabulated). Consistent with Hong et al. (2000), who find 
that adding additional variables beyond size in their models of residual analyst coverage virtually has no 
impact on the model’s total explanatory power, adding these additional variables to Equation (2) increases 
the R2 only from 0.688 to 0.670, untabulated). 
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where LNANALYSTi,t is the natural log of one plus the number of analysts issuing an 
earnings forecast for bank i in year t and other variables as previously defined.22 Consistent 
with Hong et al. (2000), size is positive and significantly related to LNANALYSTi,t in each 
year and the model has high explanatory power (R2 = 0.69, untabulated) similar to that 
reported in prior literature (Hong et al., 2000). 
To facilitate interpretation of the coefficient estimates, I follow Ramalingegowda 
and Yu (2012) and use annual scaled decile ranks for all residual institutional ownership 
and analyst following variables in most of my analyses.
23 To compute scaled decile ranks, 
I rank the residual institutional ownership percentages and analyst following by year into 
ten groups and scale the ranks to range from 0 to 1, inclusive. The coefficients in my 
analysis thus capture the impact of a change from the bottom to top decile of residual 
institutional ownership or analyst following on financial reporting quality. In all analyses, 
I also correct standard errors for bank and time-series correlations across observations by 
clustering on bank and year (Petersen, 2009).
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3.3 FINANCIAL REPORTING REGRESSION MODELS 
I first examine the relation between institutional ownership and financial analysts 
and the quality of the loan loss provision. The loan loss provision is the single most 
important accrual for the average bank.
25 Not surprisingly, many bank studies focus on the 
                                                 
22 I use logged analysts, rather than the raw number of analysts, following Hong et al. (2000) because it 
seems more likely that one extra analyst will have more of a potential impact on bank financial reporting 
quality if a firm has few analysts than if it has many. 
23 Inferences are similar if I use raw values rather than ranks (untabulated). 
24 Results are similar if I use Fama-MacBeth (1985) annual regressions and correct standard errors using the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure. This helps rule out concerns that my results could be driven by a few years 
in my sample or time-series trends in financial reporting quality, institutional ownership, or analyst following 
(untabulated). 
25 Beatty and Liao (2014) note for the years ended 2005-2012, the mean absolute value of the loan loss 




loan loss provision due to the extreme importance of this accrual for banks, the importance 
of its ability to assess the quality of bank loans (an opaque asset), and the fact that it 
significantly impacts regulatory capital ratios (Beatty and Liao, 2014). The loan loss 
provision is also one of the few policy adjustments that impact net income that a bank 
manager can make at year end without entailing substantial costs, and is the most common 
accrual manipulated by mangers (Moyer, 1990). 
The loan loss provision reflects the bank’s estimate of expected credit losses on 
loans originated during the year as well as changes in the expected losses of loans held 
during the period (Ryan, 2007). Loan loss provisions have both been criticized as being 
too large and too small at different times (GAO, 1994; Pollock, 2012); in both cases, loan 
loss provisions are inconsistent with the economic credit risk in the loan portfolio as 
revealed through ex-post credit losses. Bankers acknowledge that managing credit risk is 
“the most important aspect of the banking business model,” (American Bankers 
Association [ABA], 2010, 5) and regulators have noted that high quality information about 
bank credit quality in particular is critical for market discipline (BIS, 2001). Due to the 
magnitude of the loan loss provision, improvements to this accrual may also be a 
mechanism for improvements in other broader measures of earnings quality. If institutional 
investors and financial analysts demand a more accurate loan loss provision, all things 
equal, the provision will have a larger positive association with next period loan charge-
offs, controlling for existing loan quality.26 In fact, one of the recent proposals that 
                                                 
26 Even if the loan loss provision is estimated with perfect foresight, not all loans that are provisioned in one 
period will be charged off by the following period. As a result, not all loan loss provisions will be perfectly 
predictive of an increase by the same amount in next period charge-offs (i.e., the 1 coefficient in Equation 
(3) below will not be equal to one). Nonetheless, particularly given the existing “incurred loss” approach in 
existing accounting standards (see Trott, 2009), a high quality loan loss provision should have a strong 
positive association to the next period charge-offs. 
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accounting standard setters and regulators have pushed at least in part to enhance market 
discipline in the aftermath of the financial crisis is to encourage more forward-looking loan 
loss provisioning (Stephanou, 2010).  
I follow the model in Altamuro and Beatty (2010) and estimate the following 
regression using pooled OLS: 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1  
+ 5RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 6LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1  
+ 8LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + εi,t                  (3) 
where COi,t - total loan charge-offs of bank i in year t scaled by total assets as of the 
beginning of year t; LLPi,t - total loan loss provisions of bank i in year t scaled by total 
assets as of the beginning of year t; NPLi,t - total non-performing loans of bank i at the end 
of year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year t; ROWNi,t-1 - residual percentage 
institutional ownership of bank i at the end of year t-1; RLNANALYSTi,t-1 - residual of 
one plus logged analyst following of bank i at the end of year t-1; and other variables as 
previously defined. I use the residual institutional ownership and analyst following levels 
as of the start of the year because I am interested in the influence of the market participants 
over the current year, and this also helps minimize simultaneity concerns. 
I also examine two related but distinct features of general earnings quality: earnings 
persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows.
27
 Importantly, these 
measures of financial reporting quality are consistent with the objective of financial 
                                                 
27 As discussed in Altamuro and Beatty (2010), a positive relation with earnings persistence may reflect 
increased earnings smoothing through the loan loss provision rather than higher financial reporting quality. 
As shown in Bushman and Williams (2012), higher smoothing decreases market discipline. However, the 
persistence of the loan loss provision will not impact the tests on the ability to predict future cash flows by 
construction. Additionally, as shown in Chapter 5.2, I find residual institutional ownership is negatively 
related to benchmark-beating, which is also inconsistent with any increase in earnings persistence being 
attributable to smoothing. 
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reporting as described by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) which is to 
provide decision-useful information about the firm’s returns on economic resources (e.g., 
earnings) and prospects for future cash flows (FASB, 2010; Bratten et al., 2012).
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Additionally, both attributes increase the valuation informativeness of earnings, which is 
vital for market discipline (e.g., Lee, 1999).
29
 I follow the model in Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010) and estimate the following regression using pooled OLS:  
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1[t+2]) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 6ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 
7ROAi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + εi,t                     (4) 
where ROAi,t - return on assets calculated as pre-tax net income before extraordinary items 
of bank i in year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year t; CFROAi,t - cash return 
on assets calculated as pre-tax net income before extraordinary items plus the loan loss 
provision of bank i in year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year t (Wahlen, 
1994; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Altamuro and Beatty, 2010); and other variables as 
previously defined. Regressions with ROAi,t as the dependent variable allow testing of 
                                                 
28 These measures of financial reporting quality may also be impacted by, or correlated with, firm 
performance. In particular, earnings persistence captures the sustainability of earnings and is associated with 
firm performance (Francis et al., 2004; Li, 2008). To ensure performance is not a correlated omitted variable 
driving the results, I also include return on assets as of the start and end of the year in Equations (1) and (2) 
when determining residual institutional ownership and analyst following and obtain similar results 
(untabulated). Moreover, I rank firm-years based on return on assets or change in return on assets (similar to 
the structure of the analysis in Table 5) and find neither is significantly associated with changes in future 
financial reporting quality (untabulated). Finally, as shown in Table 13, rather than high firm performance 
resulting in both high financial reporting quality and attracting institutional investors and/or financial 
analysts, I find the positive relation between institutional investors and financial reporting quality is strongest 
for the worst performing and most risky bank-years. 
29 Easton and Zmijewski (1989) find higher earnings persistence is associated with higher earnings response 
coefficients and lower equity betas. Francis et al. (2004) find persistence is associated with lower costs of 
equity capital. Francis and Schipper (1999) and Kim and Kross (2005) state that increased ability of earnings 
to predict future cash flows increases the relevance of earnings for valuation. 
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earnings persistence while regressions with CFROAi,t as the dependent variable allow 




Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1, Panel B reports descriptive statistics. The average raw ownership by 
institutional investors (OWNi,t-1) is 21.15% which is comparable to other banking studies 
but is significantly less than non-banking studies.
30
 Similarly, the average raw analyst 
following (ANALYSTi,t-1) of 4.6 is also significantly less than non-banking studies.
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Accordingly, the unique features of the banking industry do appear to limit institutional 
ownership and analyst following.  
In untabulated analysis, there is considerable over-time variation in OWNi,t-1 and 
ANALYSTi,t-1 as the standard deviation of the yearly change for each firm in raw 
institutional ownership (analyst following) is 30.8% (25.8%) of the average raw 
institutional ownership (analyst following), respectively, indicating there are significant 
changes in institutional ownership and analyst following for a given bank over time. There 
is also a significant time trend in OWNi,t-1 as it increases from 17% to 38% from 1990 to 
2011 while ANALYSTi,t-1 remains similar over the same time period with relatively minor 
increases or decreases each year (untabulated). An added benefit of using ROWNi,t-1 and 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 in my analysis is it strips out time trends and yearly variation similar 
to year fixed-effects by using the residual institutional ownership and analyst following 
from annual regressions.  
                                                 
30 Over a similar time period (1994-2009), Deng et al. (2013, Table 1) report an average institutional 
ownership for a sample of BHCs of 23.9%. In contrast, D’Souza et al. (2010, Table 2, Panel A) use essentially 
the entire Compustat/CRSP sample (including banks) from 1991-2004 and the mean level of institutional 
ownership is 33.7%. Adams and Mehran (2003) similarly find BHCs have significantly lower institutional 
ownership totals than manufacturing firms and less than half as many institutional investors (Table 4).  
31 Lehavy et al. (2011) use essentially the entire Compustat/CRSP sample from 1995-2006 and average 
analyst following is 6.14 (Table 2).  
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While the average size in my sample is approximately 2.14 billion (𝑒7.669) 
calculated using the sample mean of logged assets (SIZEi,t-1), the sample varies 
significantly cross-sectionally on this dimension with the interquartile range of 667.81 
million (𝑒6.504) to 5.07 billion (𝑒8.532). As a result, my sample captures a broad cross-
section of banks in the U.S.
32
 Table 1, Panel C reports the Pearson and Spearman 
correlations among the main variables in my analysis. ROWNi,t-1 and RLNANALYSTi,t-1 
have a statistically significant positive correlation (rho = 0.193, p < 0.01).  
4.2 MAIN RESULTS – FINANCIAL REPORTING 
To test H1 and H2, I estimate Equations (3) and (4). Results are presented in Tables 
2 and 3. Table 2 shows the relation between information intermediaries and the ability for 
the loan loss provision to predict loan charge-offs in the following year from estimating 
Equation (3). Column 1 shows that the coefficient on LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and 
significant (0.1131, p < 0.01). This indicates that a change in residual institutional 
ownership from the bottom to top decile is associated with a dramatic increase in the 
association between the loan loss provision and next period charge-offs of over 50% 
(0.1131/0.2025). Financial analysts, however, have no statistically significant relation with 
financial reporting quality. Columns 2 and 3 report the results of estimating Equation (3) 
separately in the “high” and “low” information asymmetry banks classified using market-
adjusted stock return volatility (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Zhang, 2006). I rank banks each 
year on the monthly market-adjusted stock return volatility over the prior year and label 
banks in the top (bottom) two quintiles each year as “high” (“low”) information asymmetry 
banks.
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 The results indicate that LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is only positive and statistically 
                                                 
32 See Chapter 5.5 for more discussion on the skewed nature of bank size in my sample. 




significant for the high information asymmetry banks (0.1425, p < 0.05), and the difference 
between the high and low information asymmetry banks is statistically significant (p < 
0.05). 
Table 3, Panel A shows the relation between information intermediaries and 
earnings persistence from estimating Equation (4). Column 1 of Table 3, Panel A shows 
that the coefficient on ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant (0.1319, p < 0.01). This 
indicates that a change in residual institutional ownership from the bottom to top decile is 
associated with an increase in earnings persistence in the following year by approximately 
20% (0.1319/0.6571). However, financial analyst coverage has no statistically significant 
relation with earnings persistence. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, Panel A report the results 
of estimating Equation (4) separately in the high and low information asymmetry banks. 
The results indicate that ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is only positive and statistically significant for 
the high information asymmetry banks (0.2144, p < 0.01), and the difference between the 
high and low information asymmetry banks is statistically significant (p < 0.05). Results 
are similar although slightly weaker estimating the earnings persistence in year t+2 in 
Columns 4 – 6.  
Table 3, Panel B shows the relation between information intermediaries and the 
predictability of future cash flows from estimating Equation (4). Column 1 of Table 3, 
Panel B shows that the coefficient on ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant (0.0812, 
p < 0.05). This indicates that a change in residual institutional ownership from the bottom 
to top decile is associated with higher earnings predictability of cash flows in the following 
year by approximately 13% (0.0811/0.6346). On the other hand, financial analyst coverage 
has no statistically significant relation with earnings predictability of future cash flows. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, Panel B report the results of estimating Equation (2) separately 
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in the high and low information asymmetry banks. The results indicate that 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is only positive and statistically significant for the high information 
asymmetry banks (0.1162, p < 0.01), and the difference between the high and low 
information asymmetry banks is statistically significant (p < 0.05). Results are similar 
estimating the cash flows in year t+2 in Columns 4 – 6.  
Collectively, Tables 2 and 3 show a consistent positive relation between residual 
institutional ownership and financial reporting quality and this relation is strongest for high 
information asymmetry, rejecting H1 and H2 for institutional investors. However, it is 
particularly noteworthy that there is no significant relation between analyst following and 
financial reporting quality, inconsistent with the Yu (2008) result for non-banks. These 
results provide more evidence that bank governance mechanisms are simply different from 
non-banks (see Becht et al., 2011a). Possible explanations for the difference in the results 
between these two information intermediaries and the prior non-banking literature may be 
due to analysts lacking either the sophistication and/or the incentives to demand higher 
financial reporting quality, as well as bank managers lacking the incentives to respond to 
analyst demands. I explore these possible explanations for the analyst following null result 
in the following section. 
4.3 ADDITIONAL RESULTS - ANALYST FOLLOWING 
Regulators have emphasized that the marketplace will need sophistication and 
strong incentives to overcome bank complexity and provide market discipline. For 
example, the FDIC (1983, IV-3) notes that “The success of market discipline as a means 
to keep banks operating in a safe and sound manner is directly proportional to the value of 
the [financial] information available to market participants.” Institutional investors have 
large and direct economic incentives to demand higher quality financial reporting due to 
34 
 
the size of their investments. However, particularly due to conflicts of interest between 
many analysts and the banks they cover, analysts may lack these incentives. Moreover, 
analysts may lack the sophistication to understand and demand financial reporting quality, 
particularly given these lower incentives and bank complexity.  
In Table A2 in the Appendix, I examine whether the impact of analyst following 
on financial reporting quality varies based on analyst sophistication or a lack of 
independence to ascertain whether complexity and/or conflicts of interest lead to the null 
result on average for analyst following in Tables 2 and 3, which is different from the non-
financial literature (Yu, 2008).  
To proxy for analyst sophistication, I separately examine the impact of analyst 
following for analysts that are banking all-star and non-all-star analysts. I modify Equations 
3 and 4 as follows: 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 +  
5RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 6RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + 
7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 
9LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 
10LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + εi,t                                     (3a) 
 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 5LNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + 
6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +  
8ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 
9ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + εi,t                                    (4a) 
where RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 - residual of one plus logged all-star analyst 
following of bank i as identified by the Institutional Investor magazine at the end of year 
t-1; RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 - residual of one plus logged non-all-star analyst 
following of bank i at the end of year t-1 measured as total analyst following less all-star 
following; and other variables as previously defined. 
35 
 
Results are presented in Table A2, Panel A. Both 
LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 and LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 
are statistically insignificant from zero indicating that analyst sophistication does not 
appear to increase the predictive ability of the loan loss provision. Similarly, 
ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 and ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 
are statistically insignificant from zero at increasing earnings persistence in the following 
year. ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 is marginally significant at improving cash 
flow predictability (0.1224, p < 0.10) while  ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 
is statistically insignificant from zero, but this is the only evidence that a lack of analyst 
sophistication may be one of the causes of the null result reported in Tables 2 and 3 for 
total analyst following on average.  
In untabulated analysis, I look at alternative measures of analyst sophistication and 
separately examine the impact of analyst following for analysts that are bank-specific or 
bank-industry experts. I classify an analyst as a bank-specific expert if the analyst is in the 
top ten percent of a yearly ranking of all analysts that follow a given bank by the length of 
time the analyst has followed that bank. Similarly, I classify analysts as industry experts if 
their length of time providing forecasts for the banking industry is in the top ten percent of 
a yearly ranking of all analysts providing forecasts in the banking industry. Using these 
measures of sophistication, I find no type of analyst has a consistent statistically significant 
relation to financial reporting quality and there are no significant differences between 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated analysts and their impact on bank financial reporting 
quality. Accordingly, it does not appear analyst sophistication harms analyst’ ability to 
demand and impact bank financial reporting quality. 
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To proxy for analyst independence, I separately examine the impact of analyst 
following for analysts that do and do not have potential conflicts of interest. I modify 
Equations 3 and 4 as follows: 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 +  
5RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 + 6RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + 
7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 9LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 
+ 10LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + εi,t                                       (3b) 
 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 + 5LNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + 
6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +  
8ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 + 
9ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + εi,t                                          (4b) 
where RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 - residual of one plus logged independent analyst 
following of bank i measured as total analyst following less non-independent analyst 
following (see below) at the end of year t-1; RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 - residual of 
one plus logged non-independent analyst following of bank i at the end of year t-1 
measured as total analysts following bank i that are employed by a firm that has 
underwritten a debt or equity issuance for bank i listed in SDC Platinum within the past 
three years; and other variables as previously defined. 
Results are presented in Table A2, Panel B. Both LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-
1 and LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_ NONINDEPi,t-1 are statistically insignificant from zero 
indicating that analyst independence does not appear to increase the predictive ability of 
the loan loss provision. ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 is actually positive and 
marginally significant while ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 is statistically 
insignificant from zero at predicting earnings persistence in the following year, which 
provides weak evidence that independent analysts may actually be less successful at 
demanding and impacting bank financial reporting quality. Consistent with this, there is 
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some research for non-financial firms that independent analysts are actually worse and less 
accurate than non-independent analysts (e.g., Agrawal and Chen, 2012; Jacob et al., 2008). 
However, both ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 and ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ 
NONINDEPi,t-1 are statistically insignificant from zero at improving cash flow 
predictability in the following year, so there is no consistent evidence that analyst 
independence or lack thereof may be one of the causes of the null result for analyst 
coverage on average reported in Tables 2 and 3.  
Given these results for analysts, the remainder of the paper focuses on whether the 
positive relation between institutional ownership and financial reporting quality is due to 
institutional investors demanding financial reporting quality or an alternative explanation. 
Additionally, in Chapter 5, I examine a possible mechanism for institutional investors to 
impact financial reporting quality, additional analyses, and whether and how institutional 
investors appear to engage in market discipline. 
4.4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
As discussed above, one concern from Tables 2 and 3 is whether the positive 
relation between residual institutional ownership and financial reporting quality is due to 
institutional investors demanding financial reporting quality or an alternative explanation. 
Namely, could this relation be driven by other factors that simultaneously attract 
institutional ownership and improve financial reporting quality (the “simultaneity” 
explanation) or by banks with higher financial reporting quality attracting institutional 
ownership (the “reverse causality” explanation)? The reverse causality explanation is 
troubling because institutional investors may prefer banks with high financial reporting 
quality (i.e., a clientele effect). It should be noted that these explanations are not mutually 
exclusive. However, given public policy interest in why banks provide financial reporting 
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quality, it is critical to identify whether in fact institutional investors appear to impact the 
level of financial reporting quality or simply accept the level of financial reporting quality 
as a given to make investment decisions. 
In Table 4, I modify Equations (3) and (4) to control for both the residual 
institutional ownership levels at the end of the year and end of the following year as 
follows:  
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1  
+ 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 7ROWNi,t + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t + 9ROWNi,t+1  
+ 10LLPi,t*ROWNi,t+1 + εi,t                                  (3c) 
 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1  
+ 4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 6ROWNi,t + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t     
+ 8ROWNi,t+1 + 9ROAi,t*ROWNi,t+1 + εi,t            (4c) 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
If institutional investors demand financial reporting quality, the institutional 
ownership level as of the start of the year should be positively related to financial reporting 
quality. On the other hand, the institutional ownership level as of the end of the year 
(following year) should be positively related to financial reporting quality under the 
simultaneity (reverse causation) explanations. I find all three measures of financial 
reporting quality only have a positive and statistically significant relation with residual 
institutional ownership at the start of the year. The residual institutional ownership at the 
end of the year or the following year is generally insignificantly related to financial 
reporting quality.34  
                                                 
34 Due to the persistent nature of institutional ownership, this test may suffer from multicollinearity, which 
will result in variance inflation and bias against finding results for any of the coefficients. These concerns are 
slightly mitigated by using residual, rather than raw, institutional ownership which reduces the correlation 
between current institutional ownership with past and future institutional ownership by approximately 12%. 
Additionally, the fact that institutional ownership as of the start of the year has a statistically significant 
relation with financial reporting quality suggests this test may be effective despite the multicollinearity 
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Additionally, in Table 5, I further modify Equations (3) and (4) to test whether 
changes in the residual institutional ownership are associated with changes in financial 
reporting quality. While the method of measuring predictability of future charge-offs, 
earnings persistence, and cash flow predictability make it difficult to estimate changes over 
time, I follow the approach used in LaFond and Watts (2008) and Ramalingegowda and 
Yu (2012) and sort bank years into quintiles based on the change in institutions’ residual 
ownership from year t-1 to year t. I then estimate the following regressions for each quintile 
yearly from year t-2 to year t+1 to identify yearly measures of the level of financial 
reporting quality (i.e., 1 in Equations (3) and (4)): 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + εi,t           (3d) 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t            (4d) 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
To calculate the year-to-year change in financial reporting quality for each of those 
quintiles, I examine the change in the coefficient on the variable of interest in the pre-
ownership change period (i,t-1 - i,t-2), during-ownership change period (i,t - i,t-1), and 
post-ownership change period (i,t+1 - i,t). In the reverse causality (simultaneity) 
explanation, there should be a positive relation between residual institutional ownership 
changes from year t-1 to t and financial reporting quality changes from year t-2 to t-1 (year 
t-1 to t), respectively. If, on the other hand, institutional investors demand financial 
reporting quality, there should be a positive relation between residual institutional 
ownership changes from year t-1 to t and financial reporting quality changes from year t to 
t+1.  
                                                 
concerns. However, the analysis in Table 5, which focuses on changes in institutional ownership, should not 
suffer from the same concerns and is likely more diagnostic. 
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Table 5 presents the results. By construction, the ownership changes are 
substantially different in each quintile as the average residual ownership change in quintile 
1 is -9.51% versus quintile 5 of 11.23%. As shown in Panels A, B, and C, I find no evidence 
supporting the reverse causality or simultaneity explanations. In contrast, I find evidence 
consistent with institutional investors demanding higher financial reporting quality. 
Specifically, in tests on the predictability of future charge-offs in Panel A, predictability 
increases by 0.1779 (p < 0.05) in quintile 5 which is economically significant representing 
a 38% in future charge off predictability over the year (compared to the pre-change level 
of 0.4672, untabulated). The difference in the change in the predictability of future charge-
offs between quintiles 5 and 1 is also statistically significant (p < 0.05). In the tests on 
earnings persistence in Panel B, persistence increases by 0.1180 (p < 0.10) in quintile 5 
which is economically significant representing a 19% increase in persistence over the year 
(compared to the pre-change level of 0.6170, untabulated). The difference in the change in 
persistence between quintiles 5 and 1 is also statistically significant (p < 0.05). Finally, in 
the tests on the predictability of cash flows in Panel C, cash flow predictability increases 
by 0.1100 (p < 0.01) in quintile 5 which is economically significant representing a 28% 
increase in cash flow predictability over the year (compared to the pre-change level of 
0.3980, untabulated). The difference in the change in the predictability of cash flows 
between quintiles 5 and 1 is also statistically significant (p < 0.01).  
Finally, while Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with institutional investors demanding 
higher financial reporting quality rather than the alternative explanations, they do not rule 
41 
 
out whether institutional investors can anticipate future improvements to financial 
reporting quality. That is, an institutional investor could invest in a bank in one year 
because it anticipates the bank will already be making improvements to financial reporting 
quality in future years. This alternative explanation is related to the reverse causation 
explanation because even though the actual investment may take place before the actual 
improvements, the institutional investors are simply investing because they believe 
financial reporting quality will already be increasing, rather than they will invest and then 
demand financial reporting quality. To rule out this alternative explanation, I re-estimate 
Equations (3) and (4) using the two-year lagged values of residual institutional ownership 
(ROWNi,t-3) as shown below:  
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-3 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1  
+ 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-3 + εi,t                           (3e) 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-3 +  
4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-3 + εi,t            (4e) 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
It is particularly unlikely an institutional investor would anticipate high financial 
reporting quality three years in advance, causing them to increase their investments at that 
time. However, if institutional investors are in fact demanding financial reporting quality 
once they invest in a bank, there should continue to be improvements to financial reporting 
quality for several years, albeit likely weaker results than using the institutional ownership 
as of the start of the year. 
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Results are presented in Table 6. I find all three measures of financial reporting 
quality continue to have a positive and statistically significant or marginally significant 
relation with residual institutional ownership as of the start of year t-2.
35
 Taken together, 
the results in Tables 4 – 6 are consistent with institutional investors demanding higher 




4.5 CROSS-SECTIONAL AND TIME-SERIES VARIATION  
Finally, I exploit cross-sectional variation in the type of institutional investor and 
time-series variation to examine whether the results are strongest when one would expect 
the results to be strongest. 
                                                 
35 Alternatively, I estimate Equations (3) and (4) using the 2-year lead residual institutional ownership and 
the variable of interest is statistically insignificant from zero in all specifications (untabulated). These results 
provide assurance that results using the 3-year lagged residual institutional ownership are not simply due to 
the persistence of institutional ownership and the persistence of the earnings quality proxies. 
36 Some prior literature uses an alternative strategy to identification for asserting the influence of institutional 
investors by exploiting exogenous shocks to institutional ownership upon the addition to an index such as 
the S&P 500 (see Aghion et al., 2009) or around the Russell 1000/2000 reconstitution (see Boone and White, 
2014). However, by construction, these papers focus primarily on the impact of index funds since those 
represent the majority of changes in institutional ownership around these events. In contrast, I focus more 
broadly on total institutional ownership which includes relatively more active institutional investors and is 
the focus of banking regulators. In fact, as shown in Table 7, I find limited evidence that these quasi-indexers 
impact bank financial reporting quality. Moreover, as I focus on a single industry, I lack sufficient power to 
employ these strategies due to small sample sizes. For example, in my sample period, I observe only 25 bank 
additions to the S&P 500 and only 59 bank years within a fixed bandwidth of ± 50 around the Russell 1000 




4.5.1  Institutional Investor Type 
If the positive relation between institutional ownership and financial reporting 
quality is due to institutional investor demand, the relation should be strongest for 
institutional investors more likely to engage in monitoring. Within the group of institutional 
investors, characteristics such as investment horizons, investment concentration, and 
independence from firm management cause higher monitoring incentives among some 
institutions relative to others (Chen et al., 2007; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). 
Conversely, institutional investors that have short-term investment horizons or are not 
independent from management may be less likely to improve and may even harm financial 
reporting quality (Bushee, 1998; Matsumoto, 2002). I use the Bushee (2001) institutional 
investor classification to identify dedicated institutions based on their investment horizons 
and concentration and follow Brickley et al. (1988) to identify institutions likely 
independent of bank management. 
As described in Bushee (2001), “dedicated” institutions have low portfolio turnover 
and higher investment concentration levels, consistent with a long-term strategy to hold a 
large stake in a relatively few number of firms. In contrast, “transient” institutions have 
high portfolio turnover and low investment concentration levels, consistent with a short-
term strategy for a substantial number of firms. “Quasi-indexing” institutions have low 
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portfolio turnover and high investment diversification, more consistent with a passive long-
term strategy in a number of firms.
37  
Brickley et al. (1988) classify institutions using the entity type category assigned 
by CDA/Spectrum to gauge potential independence from management.
38
 Investment 
companies, independent investment advisors, and pension funds are less likely to have a 
business relationship with the investee firm and hence are considered “independent” from 
management. On the other hand, bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions 
are more likely to have a business relationship with the investee firm and are considered 
“non-independent.” This is particularly true for investments in the banking industry 
because bank trusts frequently invest in affiliate banks (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). I use the 
intersection of these two classification systems and consider “independent” and 
“dedicated” institutional investors to be the type of institutional investor most likely to 
monitor bank management and demand improved financial reporting quality (hereafter 
referred to as “monitoring institutions”). The remaining categories of institutional investors 
are non-independent and dedicated, quasi-indexers, and transient. I separately estimate 
Equation (1) using the ownership levels for each type of institutional investor to obtain 
                                                 
37 Because the Bushee institution classification is highly stable over time, I use the modal classification in 
my analyses. 
38 CDA/Spectrum classifies institutional investors into 5 categories: (1) bank trusts, (2) insurance companies, 
(3) investment companies, (4) independent investment advisors, and (5) other, which consists of charitable 
foundations, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), university endowments, and private and public 
pension funds. Following prior research, I use data from Brian Bushee that manually identifies pension funds 
for inclusion into my classification of “independent” institutions. There are numerous errors in the institution 
classification beginning in 1998 due to a data mapping error when CDA Spectrum was acquired. Hence, if 
an institution was classified by CDA/Spectrum prior to 1998, I use the pre-1998 classifications in subsequent 
years (Chen et al., 2007). 
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residual ownership percentages for each type in my analysis. I then augment Equations (3) 
and (4) as follows: 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4RIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
5RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 6RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 7RTRAOWNi,t-1 +  
8LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 9LLPi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
11LLPi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 12LLPi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1 + εi,t                           (3f) 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3RIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
4RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 5RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 6RTRAOWNi,t-1 + 
7ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8ROAi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 
+ 10ROAi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 11ROAi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1 + εi,t          (4f) 
where RIDEDOWNi,t-1 - residual monitoring institutional ownership of bank i at the end 
of year t-1; RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 - residual non-independent dedicated institutional ownership 
of bank i at the end of year t-1; RQIXOWNi,t-1 - residual quasi-indexer institutional 
ownership of bank i at the end of year t-1; RTRAOWNi,t-1 - residual transient institutional 
ownership of bank i at the end of year t-1; and other variables as previously defined. 
Table 7 presents the results. Column 1 shows LLPi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 is positive 
and significant (0.0672, p < 0.01). Columns 2 and 3 show ROAi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 is 
positive and significant for earnings persistence in years t+1 and t+2 (0.1105, p < 0.01; 
0.1324, p < 0.01, respectively). Finally, Columns 4 and 5 show ROAi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 is 
positive and significant for cash flow predictability in years t+1 and t+2 (0.0873, p < 0.05; 
0.1012, p < 0.05, respectively). In all cases, results are consistent with the positive relation 
between institutional ownership and financial reporting quality being driven by monitoring 
institutions. The residual ownership of no other type of institution is consistently related to 
financial reporting quality although in Columns 3-5 the residual ownership by dedicated, 
non-independent institutions is negatively related to financial reporting quality and is 
statistically or marginally statistically significant. Therefore, there is some (weak) evidence 
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that investments from dedicated non-independent institutions, which may be related parties 
or have business relationships with the investee bank, may actually harm bank financial 
reporting quality. Additionally, the coefficient on the residual ownership by quasi-indexers 
for all measures of financial reporting quality is positive and is marginally significant or 
close to marginally significant for earnings persistence and the predictability of future cash 
flows in Columns 2-5 (t = 1.81, 1.59, 1.56, 1.54, respectively). As a result, even though 
these institutions are relatively passive investors, they may still exert influence over bank 
financial reporting quality, particularly given that quasi-indexers make up the largest 
proportion of banks’ institutional investors and are generally long-term investors.
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4.5.2  Financial Crisis 
Given that I find institutional investors improve bank financial reporting quality 
over this full time period, it is also informative to examine whether their impact differed 
during the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, the role of financial reporting was 
arguably even more important. After all, investors allege that a lack of transparency in 
financial reporting exacerbated the financial crisis by leading to a loss of investor trust 
(CFA Institute, 2013). As a result, institutional investors may have increased their demands 
for bank financial reporting quality during the height of the crisis. Moreover, the need for 
                                                 
39 In untabulated analysis, I also examine the concentration of the institutional ownership because 
institutional investors would be expected to have more influence when they are larger shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). I find the ownership percentage by the top 5 institutional 
investors in a bank year is also positive and significantly associated with financial reporting quality. However, 
many of those large institutional investors are also monitoring institutions. When I also control for the total 
monitoring institutional ownership, the top 5 institutional ownership percentage is generally statistically 
insignificantly related to financial reporting quality, indicating the type of institutional investor is more 




market discipline through the financial statements is particularly important during times of 
a crisis. 
That said, given the difficulties in estimating future credit losses and profitability 
during the financial crisis, it is possible that bank managers simply may not have been able 
to increase financial reporting quality. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that bank 
managers lost a considerable portion of their wealth during the financial crisis, suggesting 
even they did not understand their own credit exposures during the period. Additionally, 
bank managers and institutional investors may have been fixated more on regulatory capital 
or other earnings attributes during this time period. As a result, it is not clear whether or 
not institutional investors would both demand and be able to improve bank financial 
reporting quality in the crisis. 
I modify Equations (3) and (4) to interact them with a dummy variable for the 
financial as follows:  
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1  
+ 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 7CRISISi,t + 8LLPi,t*CRISISi,t +  
9SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 10NPLi,t*CRISISi,t + 11ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 
12LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 13LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + εi,t              (3g) 
 
ROAi,t+1(CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 6CRISIS + 7ROAi,t*CRISISi,t +     
8SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 9ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 10ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t  
+ 11ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + εi,t                        (4g) 
where CRISISi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank year is in 2007 or 2008 and 
set to zero otherwise; and other variables as previously defined. 
Results are presented in Table 8. I find some evidence of an increased ability to 
improve financial reporting quality by institutional investors. The association between 
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residual institutional ownership and both the predictability of future charge-offs and 
earnings persistence increases during the crisis (0.297, p < 0.01 and 0.261, p < 0.05, 
respectively). There is no incremental impact of institutional investors on the predictability 
of future cash flows during the financial crisis. As a result, I provide some evidence that 
institutional investors either increased their demand or were more successful at impacting 
bank financial reporting quality when that financial reporting quality was most important 




Chapter 5: Additional Analysis 
5.1 VOTING WITH THEIR FEET 
Given results that institutional investors improve financial reporting quality, I 
investigate how they may improve it, that is, the mechanism for them to demand bank 
managers to improve financial reporting quality. While institutional investors have 
historically been prohibited from having a director on the Board and are limited in their 
ability to engage in shareholder activism, they can still have informal interactions with 
management as an observer at the Board meetings (Federal Reserve Board, 2008) and/or 
via private communications with bank management. Moreover, based on informal 
communications with industry professionals, institutional investors find ways to ensure 
bank managers know what they want. Thus, while institutional investors are significantly 
limited by regulatory restrictions in their ability to force bank managers to respond to their 
demands, they can generally advocate for potential changes in a bank’s policies and 
operations (Federal Reserve Board, 2008). Corporations are also willing to dedicate 
significant time and attention to managing the needs of their institutional investors (Beyer 
et al., 2014).  
CFOs acknowledge that institutional investors may penalize a firm that has a drop 
in stock price from something like missing an earnings target by selling shares because 
investors “sell first and ask questions later” (Graham et al., 2005, 53).
40
 Institutional 
investors themselves acknowledge that they are willing to use their vote to encourage better 
financial reporting. For example, BlackRock (2014) states, “where company reporting and 
disclosure is inadequate… we will engage with the company and/or use our vote to 
                                                 
40 While one could argue whether a diversified institutional investor should care about a negative market 
reaction for a single firm, CFOs indicate that they believe idiosyncratic risk matters and note “these investors 
diversify by holding less of our stock and more of someone else’s” (Graham et al., 2005, 53).  
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encourage a change in practice.” As a result, the threat of institutional investors selling 
their investments is a very strong ex-ante motivator of firm behavior.  
Bharath et al. (2013) show that institutional investors’ threat of selling a firm’s 
stock is generally a powerful governance mechanism, distinct from other traditional forms 
of block holder intervention, and managers appear willing to take actions to induce those 
institutional investors to stay. However, managers must view the threat as credible. In the 
context of the banking industry, it is less clear whether these threats will be deemed credible 
due to explicit regulatory prohibitions on using the threat of exit to compel bank managers 
to respond to demands (Federal Reserve Board, 2008).41 Accordingly, I test whether 
institutional investors are willing to “vote with their feet” to communicate their 
dissatisfaction if a bank does not have high financial reporting quality (see Parrino et al., 
2003).42  
Using the announcement of a restatement as a shock to perceived financial 
reporting quality, I examine changes in institutional ownership in the quarters around the 
restatement announcement. To focus on restatements that are most indicative of a lack of 
financial reporting quality, I omit any restatements resulting solely from clerical errors. 
Following Parrino et al. (2003), I construct a control sample of banks that are matched to 
                                                 
41 The Federal Reserve Board (2008) policy on equity investments in banks notes that, “Importantly, 
communications by minority investors should not be accompanied by explicit or implicit threats to dispose 
of shares in the banking organization… as a condition of action or non-action by the banking organization or 
its management.” However, in informal communications with industry professionals, this provision would 
be hard to enforce, and I am unaware of the Federal Reserve ever taking actions against institutional investors 
based on violations of these restrictions. 
42 It should be emphasized that I am unable to test the ex-ante threat of exit but rather test for the actual ex-
post exit by institutional investors. I then infer that the exit is the consequence of an ex-ante demand made to 
bank managers. However, even if the exit by institutional investors was not preceded by the threat of exit, 
because bank managers can observe whether or not institutional investors have sold other bank shares before 
in response to perceived low financial reporting quality and this is a repeated-game setting, bank managers 
would implicitly be aware of the consequences of not affirmatively responding to demands for improved 
financial reporting quality. 
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the restatement bank based on time, size, and stock returns. Specifically, I find non-
restatement banks with a market capitalization between 70% and 130% of the restatement 
bank prior to the restatement announcement date and then choose the bank with the closest 
stock return to the restatement bank over the prior year.
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The sample period for these tests are restatements announced from 2000-2011 and 
includes 154 restatement announcements plus the matched control banks if available. It 
should be noted that these are relatively “minor” restatements on average, so any trading 
by institutional investors based on this news is unlikely to be directly due to concerns about 
future cash flows or firm prospects.44  
Table 9 provides the results for total raw institutional ownership and total raw 
monitoring ownership. For total institutional ownership in Panel A, I find no significant 
difference in the changes in institutional ownership relative to the control sample prior to 
the restatement announcement. Following the restatement announcement, however, I 
observe a significant decrease in institutional ownership relative to the control sample 
beginning 3-4 quarters after the restatement announcement (-0.77%, p < 0.05) and 
continuing throughout the following year (-1.64%, p < 0.05).
 45
 In total, I observe a decrease 
                                                 
43 To mitigate concerns of information leakage around the restatement announcement, I use the market 
capitalization and end the prior year stock return window 5 days before the announcement date. 
44 In untabulated analysis, the three day announcement return for the restaters is only a -1.26 market-adjusted 
return and only 7% of the restatements involve an SEC investigation. 
45 I use the date corresponding to the first public identification of the need to restate because institutional 
investors may start trading immediately based on this news, but this date may not actually be the date restated 
financial statements are filed with the SEC. In fact, it is likely that many restatements, particularly more 
severe ones, are actually filed subsequent to this date, which may explain why I do not observe a significant 
decrease in the quarters immediately following the restatement announcement. I lack the data to test for 
changes in ownership around the date that the actual restated financial statements were provided to the SEC. 
However, in untabulated tests, I examine changes in institutional ownership around the date the bank 
discloses the restatement in Item 4.02 of the 8-K, indicating that previously issued financial statements should 
not be relied upon. While not all banks even file the need to restate on Item 4.02 and the bank may have 
previously disclosed the need to restate, disclosure of the restatement on Item 4.02 provides additional 
information on the materiality and severity of the restatement. Using this date, I find a statistically significant 
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in institutional ownership of 1.83% (p < 0.10) relative to the control sample which equates 
to over 5% of the total institutional ownership as of the end of quarter with the restatement 
announcement (-1.83/35.06). Panel B similarly reports a significant decrease in the 
holdings by monitoring institutions after the restatement announcement. Despite 
comprising only around 11% of the total institutional ownership of the restating banks at 
time zero (3.83/35.06), the decrease in institutional ownership by monitoring institutions 
represents nearly 37% of the total institutional ownership decrease (-0.67/-1.83). 
Importantly, the fact that these long-term institutional investors are selling their 
investments in response to the announcement of relatively minor restatements is consistent 
with them previously demanding and expecting improvements to financial reporting 
quality as a condition of their investment. Panel C reports the results of changes in 
ownership by all other institutional investors. Interestingly, even non-monitoring 
institutions decrease their ownership by 0.82% in the restatement announcement quarter (p 
< 0.10) driven by quasi-indexing institutions and an additional decrease 3-4 quarters after 
the announcement (-0.72, p < 0.05) driven by both quasi-indexing institutions and transient 
institutions. Hence, while these other types of institutions place less of a role in ex-ante 
monitoring of financial reporting quality, they may still respond to ex-post signals of poor 
financial reporting quality. 
Collectively, these results are consistent with institutional investors, particularly 
monitoring institutions, demanding high financial reporting quality ex-ante and divesting 
ownership interests ex-post if it is revealed those demands are not met.46 Given that 
                                                 
decrease in institutional ownership relative to matched firms with a statistically significant decrease in the 
first quarter after the announcement. 
46 These results would also be consistent with a reverse-causality story whereby institutional investors buy 
(sell) bank stocks with high (low) financial reporting quality. While these stories are not mutually exclusive, 
it should be noted that on average over my full sample period, I do not find evidence of institutional investors 
buying (selling) bank stocks based on changes in financial reporting quality (see Table 5).  
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institutional selling can adversely impact share prices and liquidity, this is likely to be an 
effective strategy to influence bank management (e.g., Brown and Brooke, 1993; Edmans, 
2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Parrino et al., 2003).
47  
5.2 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
There is no universally acknowledged measure of financial reporting or earnings 
quality (Dechow et al, 2010). Rather, since not all proxies for financial reporting “quality” 
capture the same fundamental construct, financial reporting quality can only be defined for 
a specific setting. To that end, I focus in this study on the role of accounting in enhancing 
the ability for market participants to monitor and discipline a bank. Given my results, it 
appears that institutional investors believe earnings persistence, the ability of earnings to 
predict future cash flows, and the ability of the loan loss reserve to predict future loan 
charge-offs all aid in fulfilling that monitoring objective. 
However, given that institutional investors appear to care about financial reporting 
quality and are effective at impacting it, it is worthwhile to examine some additional 
measures of financial reporting quality to provide additional evidence on how institutional 
investors impact bank financial reporting quality. To do so, I follow prior literature and 
examine whether institutional investors also appear to reduce bank earnings management. 
                                                 
47 Results that institutional investors indeed sell shares, which may adversely impact share prices, based on 
financial reporting quality may also help explain the lack of a statistically significant relation between 
financial analysts and financial reporting quality because analysts lack this mechanism to potentially impact 
share prices. In untabulated analysis, I examine whether analyst following also decreases subsequent to the 
announcement of a restatement, and I find no statistically significant change in the post-restatement 
announcement period. This provides additional evidence that managers will be more incentivized to 
proactively respond to demands from institutional investors rather than demands from analysts. 
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While Equation (3) focuses on whether managers use discretion in estimating the 
loan loss provision to result in a more predictive accrual (which could either be smaller or 
larger than the provision would have been recorded at in the absence of such discretion), 
the loan loss provision can also be managed to overstate income and regulatory capital 
(Beatty et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2009). Additionally, banks can also manage earnings 
through selectively selling securities to realize security gains (Beatty et al., 2002). This 
second method in particular may be effective as it is relatively unregulated and unaudited 
(Cornett et al., 2009). In either case, given the importance of the earnings number in bank 
valuation, higher earnings management would make it more difficult for institutional 
investors to use the financial statements to engage in market discipline. 
I follow methods used in prior research to estimate the discretionary portion of the 
loan loss provision and realized security sales (Beatty et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2009). I 
first estimate the following annual regression to estimate the discretionary portion of the 
loan loss provision: 
LOANLOSSi,t = 0 + 1SIZEi,t + 2∆NPLi,t + 3LLRi,t + 4LOAN_REi,t +  
5LOAN_COMi,t + 6LOAN_DEPi,t + 7LOAN_AGi,t + 8LOAN_CONi,t +   
9LOAN_FOREIGNi,t + εi,t                (5) 
where LOANLOSSi,t - loan loss provision of bank i in year t scaled by average gross loans 
as of the beginning and end of the year; LLRi,t - loan loss reserve of bank i in year t scaled 
by gross loans as of the beginning of the year; LOAN_REi,t - percentage of total gross loans 
of bank i in year t that are real estate loans; LOAN_COMi,t - percentage of total gross loans 
of bank i in year t that are commercial loans; LOAN_DEPi,t - percentage of total gross 
loans of bank i in year t that are depository institution loans; LOAN_AGi,t - percentage of 
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total gross loans of bank i in year t that are agricultural loans; LOAN_CONi,t - percentage 
of total gross loans of bank i in year t that are other consumer loans; LOAN_FOREIGNi,t - 
percentage of total gross loans of bank i in year t that are foreign government loans; and 
other variables as previously defined.  
The discretionary component of the loan loss provision is the error term from this 
regression. However, because discretionary security sales is standardized by assets, rather 
than average gross loans, I follow Cornett et al. (2009) and transform the error term as 
follows to have a common scalar: 
DLOANLOSSi,t = εi,t * ((GROSSLOANi,t + GROSSLOANi,t-1) / 2) / ATi,t-1       (6) 
where DLOANLOSSi,t - discretionary loan loss provision of bank i in year t scaled by 
assets as of the beginning of the year; GROSSLOANi,t - total gross loans of bank i in year 
t; ATi,t - total assets of bank i in year t.  
Similarly, to find discretionary realized security sales, I follow Beatty et al. (2002) 
and run the following annual regressions: 
RSGLi,t = 0 + 1SIZEi,t-1 + 2UNGLi,t + εi,t            (7) 
where RSGLi,t - total security gains on held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities of 
bank i in year t scaled by assets as of the beginning of the year; UNGLi,t - total unrealized 
net gain on available-for-sale securities currently reported in other comprehensive income 
scaled by assets as of the beginning of the year; and other variables as previously defined.  
I then calculate total signed earnings management as the sum of these two 
discretionary income components. Note, because larger loan loss provisions decrease 
earnings, to calculate the total income increasing earnings management, I have to subtract 
discretionary loan loss provisions as follows: 
EMi,t = RSGLi,t - DLOANLOSSi,t                    (8) 
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where EMi,t – total signed earnings management for bank i in year t scaled by assets as of 
the beginning of the year; and other variables as previously defined.  
 Finally, to examine the impact of residual institutional ownership on earnings 
management, I follow prior literature and perform the following regression following prior 
literature (Beatty and Altamuro, 2010): 
EMi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ATGROWTHi,t + 4LOANSi,t + 5NPLi,t  
+ 6LEVi,t + 7CFGROWTH i,t + εi,t            (9) 
where ATGROWTHi,t - change in assets in bank i from the beginning to the end of year t 
scaled by assets as of the beginning of the year; LOANSi,t - total gross loans of bank i at 
the end of year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year t; LEVi,t - total equity in 
bank i at the end of year t scaled by total assets as of the end of the year; CFGROWTHi,t - 
change in total cash flows in bank i from the beginning to the end of year t where cash 
flows are calculated as net income plus the loan loss provision scaled by assets as of the 
beginning of the year; and other variables as previously defined. 
Results are presented in Table 10, Panel A. ROWNi,t-1 has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on income increasing earnings management (-0.0173, p < 
0.05). As a result, in additional to having more predictive accruals and earnings numbers, 
institutional investors appear to demand less earnings management by banks. 
I also estimate an alternative measure of earnings management: benchmark beating. 
Following Beatty and Altamuro (2010), I estimate the following regression: 
SMALLPOSi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ATGROWTHi,t + 4LOANSi,t  
 + 5NPLi,t + 6LEVi,t + 7CFGROWTH i,t + εi,t                    (10) 
where SMALLPOSi,t - is set to one if the change in pre-tax income for bank i from year t-
1 to year t scaled by assets as of the beginning of the year is in the interval between 0 and 
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0.0008, inclusive and set to zero otherwise; and all other variables are as previously 
defined. 
Results are presented in Table 10, Panel B. I find residual institutional ownership 
is negatively related to benchmark beating (-0.138, p < 0.05). Collectively, Table 10 
provides additional evidence on how institutional investors improve bank financial 
reporting quality. 
5.3 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
Thus far the paper examines whether information intermediaries demand better 
quality financial reporting. I focus on improvements to required financial reporting given 
bank regulators’ emphasis on improving the quality of the numbers in the financial 
statements themselves, particularly the loan loss provision (Chakrabarty, 2013; Mishkin, 
2007). However, it is also possible that the market may want additional supplemental 
information. Little is known about the determinants of bank voluntary disclosure (Spiegel 
and Yamori, 2004). 
Given that I find institutional investors demand higher quality and arguably more 
accurate financial reporting, I also examine whether they impact whether or not a bank 
issues management earnings forecasts. As noted by the International Corporate 
Governance Network, a group representing major institutional investors, “Corporations 
should disclose accurate, adequate and timely information… so as to allow investors to 
make informed decisions about the acquisition… and sale of shares” (The Conference 
Board, 2001). Providing earnings guidance fulfills the need of providing more timely 
information, and given the use of financial reporting in market discipline, providing more 
timely information about the expectation for future earnings would likely be highly desired 
by bank institutional investors. 
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Ajinkya et al. (2005) examine the impact of institutional owners on management 
earnings forecasts for the full sample of firms in First Call and find that institutional 
ownership, as predicted, is positively associated with the likelihood that a firm issues 
earnings forecasts. Given the differences between non-financial and financial firms (and 
institutional investors in those firms), I examine this question in my sample using the 
following probit model following prior literature: 
FORECASTi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3LOSSi,t + 4BMi,t +  
5EARNVOLATILITYi,t + εi,t                                (11) 
where FORECASTi,t - one if the bank issued any earnings forecasts during the fiscal period 
and set to zero otherwise; LOSSi,t - one if the firm reported losses before taxes and 
extraordinary items in the current period and set to zero otherwise; EARNVOLATILITYi,t 
- standard deviation of three years of income before taxes and extraordinary items ending 
in the current period; and other variables as previously defined. 
 Results are presented in Table 11. Consistent with Ajinkya et al. (2005), ROWNi,t-
1 is positive and significantly associated with the propensity to issue earnings forecasts 
(0.250, p < 0.01). Other variables load in expected directions. Given this positive relation 
between institutional ownership and earnings forecasts, the lower institutional ownership 
in banks relative to non-banks may partially explain why so few banks provide 
management forecasts.48 Given the potential benefits of voluntary disclosure for market 
discipline, this suggests an additional unintended consequence of limiting institutional 
ownership in banks. 
                                                 




The focus of this paper is the impact of institutional investors and financial analysts 
given their critical role as the main information intermediaries in the market (Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004). However, it is also possible that other market participants may improve 
financial reporting quality, which will improve its ability to facilitate market discipline. 
One such participant is the external auditor. 
While I am not aware of any prior research that has separately examined the impact 
of audit quality on bank financial reporting quality, it is generally held that high-quality 
audits mitigate earnings management and enhance financial reporting quality (e.g., Bartov 
et al., 2000; Francis et al., 1999). Moreover, banking regulators have long stressed the 
importance of a high-quality external audit for banks (BIS, 2008). As summarized in BIS 
(2014), “External auditors of banks can play an important role in contributing to financial 
stability when they deliver quality bank audits which foster market confidence in banks’ 
financial statements.” At the same time, however, bank regulators have noted numerous 
instances of audit failures in the financial crisis, and have recently issued new guidance to 
bank auditors on how to effectively audit a bank (BIS, 2014). This raises the question of 
whether or not relatively high-quality audits have had an impact on bank financial reporting 
quality.  
To examine whether auditors have also played a role in bank financial reporting 
quality relative to the other market participants that are the focus of my paper, I augment 
Equations (3) and (4) as follows to also examine whether or not banks with a Big N auditor 
had higher financial reporting quality: 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1  
+ 5RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 6BIGNi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1  
+ 9LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*BIGNi,t-1 + εi,t             (3h) 
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ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4RLNANALYSTi,t-1  + 5BIGNi,t-1 + 6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1  
+ 8ROAi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*BIGNi,t-1 + εi,t                           (4h) 
where BIGNi,t-1 – dummy variable set equal to one if bank i has a Big N auditor in year t -
1 and zero otherwise; and other variables are as previously defined. 
 Results are presented in Table 12 and are limited to the 2000-2011 time frame 
where I have complete auditor data. LLPi,t*BIGNi,t-1 and ROAi,t*BIGNi,t-1 are 
insignificantly related to all measures of financial reporting quality. Consistent with Tables 
3 and 4, institutional ownership (analyst following) is positive and significantly 
(insignificantly) related to financial reporting quality. As a result, despite the regulatory 
focus on audit quality for banks, there is no evidence of a higher audit quality improving 
financial reporting quality. These findings help validate bank regulators’ recent recognition 
of the need for improvements in bank auditing (BIS, 2014). 
5.5 BANK SIZE 
As discussed in Chapter 4.1, the distribution of bank size is highly skewed with a 
few banks having a significant portion of the total assets and deposits in the banking 
industry. For example, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo alone had 
nearly 33% of total bank deposits in 2014 (SNL, 2015). Not surprisingly, these largest 
banks also have larger levels of institutional ownership and analyst following.49 To ensure 
                                                 
49 In my sample, the money center banks average total institutional ownership of 45.5% and total analyst 
following of 21.9 analysts as of the start of the year (untabulated). 
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that these largest “money center” banks are not driving my results, I drop the full list of 
money center banks as identified in Khan (2010) in untabulated analysis. 
Results are similar when I omit these largest banks. LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive 
and significant (0.1038, p < 0.05) indicating that institutional investors are still positively 
associated with increased predictive ability of the loan loss provision of a similar 
magnitude as in the full sample. Similarly, ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant 
(0.1341, p < 0.01) for earnings persistence and is positive and significant (0.0827, p < 0.01) 
for cash flow predictability in the following year. Analyst following remains statistically 
unrelated to financial reporting quality in all specifications.  
Furthermore, in additional untabulated tests, I drop all bank years with total assets 
less than $500 million, which drops around 16% of my sample. Starting in 2006, bank 
holding companies less than $500 million were generally exempted from filing the FR Y-
9C because the cost of this detailed financial information was deemed to be greater than 
the benefit it provided for these smaller banks. These banks have significantly lower levels 
of institutional ownership and analyst following.50 
Results remain similar to those presented in Tables 2 and 3 in my full sample. 
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant (0.1237, p < 0.01) indicating that institutional 
investors are still positively associated with increased predictive ability of the loan loss 
provision of a similar magnitude as in the full sample. Similarly, ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is 
                                                 
50 In my sample, these smaller banks average total institutional ownership of 6.8% and total analyst 
following of 0.4 analysts (untabulated). 
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positive and significant (0.1681, p < 0.01) for earnings persistence and is positive and 
significant (0.1037, p < 0.01) for cash flow predictability in the following year. Analyst 
following remains statistically unrelated to financial reporting quality in all specifications. 
Accordingly, my results are not driven by the smallest or largest banks in my 
sample but rather speak to the banking industry as a whole.  
5.6 BANK RISK 
In my final analyses, given institutional investors demand high financial reporting 
quality on average, I then examine the relation between this demand and bank risk. Not all 
bank risk is necessarily sub-optimal. The key for effective bank regulation as noted by Jean 
Tirole is to prevent banks from taking “too much risk” (Moshinsky, 2014, emphasis added). 
The role of financial reporting in market discipline, therefore, is to allow market 
participants to “screen out good from bad credit risks or to monitor the firm to ensure that 
it does not take on too much risk” (Mishkin, 2007). As a result, high financial reporting 
quality is particularly important for high risk banks (FDIC, 1983). After all, market 
discipline of these banks is particularly important to help ensure their survival. If 
institutional investors perform this market discipline using bank financial information, 
institutional investors in high risk banks should demand higher financial reporting quality. 
Table 13 presents the results of examining this question estimating Equations (3) 
and (4) separately for the “high” and “low” risk banks. I rank banks each year on the ex-
ante bank risk as of the start of the year and label banks in the bottom (top) two quintiles 
each year as “high” (“low”) risk. To measure ex-ante bank risk, I follow prior literature 
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and use the bank’s ZSCOREi,t-1, the natural logarithm of the sum of the return on assets 
and capital asset ratio scaled by the standard deviation of the bank’s return on assets 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lepetit and Strobel, 2013). The intuition for ZSCOREi,t is it 
measures the distance from insolvency, that is, how quickly losses could deplete equity, 
causing the bank to fail. Note, higher values of ZSCOREi,t indicate less, not more, risk. 
The results indicate that LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant for high risk 
banks at predicting future charge-offs (0.2004, p < 0.01), is insignificant for low risk banks, 
and the difference between the subsamples is statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and significant for the high risk banks at predicting future 
period earnings (0.1951, p < 0.01), is negative and marginally significant for the low risk 
banks (-0.1200, p < 0.10), and the difference between the subsamples is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). Similarly ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 is positive and marginally significant 
for the high risk banks at predicting future period cash flows (0.0670, p < 0.10) and is 
insignificant for the low risk banks.
51
 These results are consistent with institutional 
investors demanding high financial reporting quality from banks where it is particularly 
crucial to perform market discipline. 
Finally, while the focus of this study is on bank financial reporting quality, evidence 
that institutional investors demand higher financial reporting quality, particularly for high 
risk banks, suggests there may also be a direct relation between institutional investors and 
                                                 
51 To ensure that these results are distinct from the sorts on information asymmetry in Tables 2 and 3, in 
untabulated analysis, I also control for information asymmetry and find similar results. 
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bank risk. This is important to examine for multiple reasons. First, from a public policy 
perspective, the ownership restrictions on bank institutional ownership are due to concerns 
that they may increase bank risk and failures (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2003; Federal 
Reserve Board, 2008), so direct evidence on this point should be informative to banking 
regulators. Second, most research on bank risk does not incorporate information about the 
bank’s ownership structure (Laeven and Levine, (2009), and the limited empirical evidence 
is not conclusive (Becht et al., 2011a). Finally, as my sample period includes the Financial 
Crisis, it is a powerful time period to test this question for U.S. banks.  
I first test the relation between residual institutional ownership and a commonly 
accepted measure of ex-ante bank risk referred to as ZSCORE in the literature (see Lepetit 
and Strobel, 2013 for a discussion on the growing use of the ZSCORE in the banking 
literature). I estimate the following model using pooled OLS: 
ZSCOREi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2NPLi,t + 3SIZEi,t-1 + 4GAPRATIOi,t +  
5LOANSi,t + 6LOANGROWTHi,t + 7DEPOSITGROWTHi,t + εi,t         (12) 
where ZSCOREi,t - ex-ante bank risk calculated as the natural logarithm of the sum of the 
return on assets and capital asset ratio of bank i at the end of year t scaled by the standard 
deviation of the bank’s return on assets; GAPRATIOi,t - absolute net rate sensitive assets 
of bank i at the end of year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year t; 
LOANGROWTHi,t - percentage growth in total gross loans of bank i from the beginning 
to the end of year t; DEPOSITGROWTHi,t - percentage growth in total deposits of bank i 
from the beginning to the end of year t; and other variables as previously defined.  
Table 14, Panel A presents the results from estimating Equation (12). Controlling 
for a variety of other determinants of bank risk including loan quality, asset composition, 
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and interest sensitivity, Column 1 shows the relation between ROWNi,t-1 and ZSCOREi,t is 
positive (indicating ex-ante bank risk is lower) and statistically significant (0.1966, p < 
0.05). In economic terms, this is the equivalent of an increase from the bottom to top decile 
of residual institutional ownership reducing average bank risk by 7.9% (0.1966/2.494). 
Column 2 reports the results of modifying Equation (12) using a changes specification by 
first-differencing all variables. ∆ROWNi,t is positive and marginally significant (0.1110, p 
< 0.10). Accordingly, institutional ownership appears to reduce ex-ante bank risk. 
I then examine the impact of institutional ownership on realized future loan quality 
as an ex-post measure of bank risk and future credit losses. I focus on future non-
performing loans because for most banks, lending is the primary source of both value 
creation and risk (Harris et al., 2013), and the main driver of bank failures was alleged to 
be bad quality loans (SEC, 2008). Non-performing loans are loans that have been modified 
in a troubled debt restructuring, are past due, or for which interest revenue is not being 
recorded. Non-performing loans are relatively non-discretionary and essentially represent 
economic losses and foregone interest revenue related to poor credit quality of the borrower 
(Liu et al., 1997; Cantrell et al., 2014). Hence, I estimate the following model using pooled 
OLS: 
NPLi,t+1 = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2NPLi,t + 3SIZEi,t-1 + 4LOANGROWTHi,t +  
5DEPOSITGROWTHi,t + εi,t                         (13) 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
Table 14, Panel B presents the results from estimating Equation (13). Column 1 
shows ROWNi,t-1 is negatively related to future non-performing loans (-0.0008, p < 0.05). 
In economic terms, this is the equivalent of an increase from the bottom to top decile of 
residual institutional ownership reducing the average NPLi,t+1 by 7.3% (0.0008/0.011). 
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Column 2 modifies Equation (13) to use a changes specification and finds a similar 
negative relation (-0.0007, p < 0.05). Hence, institutional ownership appears to reduce the 
likelihood of future non-performing loans. Thus, contrary to concerns by regulators, higher 
institutional ownership appears to reduce bank risk and credit losses; however, it should be 
emphasized that these results cannot speak to whether or not the existing levels of bank 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This study examines the relation between institutional investors and financial 
analysts, and bank financial reporting quality. High financial reporting quality is necessary 
for market discipline, one of the three pillars of effective bank regulation, and is also 
directly important to bank regulators. My main findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, higher institutional ownership is positively associated with financial reporting quality 
but analyst following has no statistically significant relation with financial reporting 
quality. In additional analysis, I also find no statistically significant relation between audit 
quality and financial reporting quality. Second, this positive association for institutional 
investors is stronger for banks with higher information asymmetry and for institutional 
investors likely to demand financial reporting quality. Third, lead-lag tests and changes 
evidence are consistent with institutional investors demanding financial reporting quality 
and inconsistent with alternative explanations. In sum, institutional investors, but not 
analysts, appear to demand and improve financial reporting quality. 
Additionally, institutional investors appear willing to vote with their feet if 
demands for financial reporting quality are not met, reducing their investment upon the 
announcement of a restatement. These results suggest a possible mechanism for 
institutional investors to impact financial reporting quality: the threat of exit. Institutional 
investors also appear to reduce earnings management and demand additional disclosures 
in the form of management earnings forecasts. Finally, the demand by institutional 
investors for financial reporting quality is strongest for high risk banks, and institutional 
investors appear to directly reduce bank ex-ante risk and realized future credit losses, 
consistent with institutional investors engaging in market discipline.  
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This study joins a growing empirical literature examining bank financial reporting 
quality (see Beatty and Liao, 2014). While numerous research has examined consequences 
of bank financial reporting quality (e.g., Bushman and Williams, 2012), less is known 
about the determinants of why financial reporting quality varies across banks. Collectively, 
the results that institutional investors improve bank financial reporting quality are 
consistent with institutional investors being an important component of bank governance 
and bank regulators’ growing emphasis on market discipline.  
As noted in Llewellyn (2005), market discipline is something of a “Black Box,” 
whereby it is widely assumed that it has some role in disciplining banks but the mechanism 
of how that happens is not clear. Evidence that institutional investors appear to demand 
high quality (and additional) accounting information which is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for market discipline, that they are willing to sell shares if this 
information is not provided, and that they appear to use this information to impact bank 
risk levels helps shed light on how market discipline actually works in the banking system.  
An additional implication of this paper is that bankers themselves may want to 
consider ways to reach out to and attract additional institutional ownership, particularly 
monitoring institutions, as part of their optimal governance structure if they are trying to 
signal a commitment to high quality financial reporting and transparency. With respect to 
analysts, the null result I find for the impact of analyst following and financial reporting 
quality is likely due to a lack of sophistication and/or incentives. The fact that this is 
opposite of results for non-financial firms (Yu, 2008) further emphasizes the importance 




My results cannot speak definitively to whether or not existing bank regulations 
limiting institutional investor ownership and bank influence are suboptimal because 
institutional investor and other market participant behavior could change based on changes 
in bank regulation. Nonetheless, theory predicts that institutions may have even more 
incentive and ability to demand financial reporting quality and engage in market discipline 
in the absence of such regulation. This remains an important area for future research.   
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Chapter 7: Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
Selection process # of bank-years 
Bank-years in bank holding company (BHC) database from 1990-2011 with required 
financial data for main tests 
 24,583 
Less:   
   Bank-years for private BHCs or BHCs unable to match to CRSP (16,013)  
   Bank-years in CRSP with missing data to compute residual ownership measures (1,671)  
Final main sample from 1990-2011 (845 BHCs)  6,899 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean. P25 P50 P75 Std Dev 
OWNi,t-1 21.148 3.638 15.045 33.391 20.840 
ROWNi,t-1 0.118 -7.625 -1.091 7.311 13.580 
ANALYSTi,t-1 4.631 1.000 2.000 6.000 6.721 
LNANALYSTi,t-1 1.206 0.693 1.099 1.946 0.984 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.059 -0.285 0.106 0.434 0.511 
RIDEDOWNi,t-1 0.024 -1.509 -0.682 0.346 2.907 
RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 0.121 -0.972 -0.510 -0.048 2.269 
RQIXOWNi,t-1 0.093 -5.571 -1.068 5.496 9.619 
RTRAOWNi,t-1 0.079 -1.731 -0.531 0.792 3.347 
SIZEi,t 7.669 6.504 7.325 8.532 1.594 
COi,t 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.006 
LLPi,t 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 
NPLi,t 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.012 0.014 
ROAi,t 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.013 
CFROAi,t 0.018 0.014 0.019 0.023 0.010 
ZSCOREi,t 2.494 2.049 2.626 3.157 1.585 
GAPRATIOi,t 0.163 0.060 0.128 0.229 0.136 
LOANSi,t 0.721 0.619 0.713 0.811 0.179 
LOANGROWTHi,t 0.115 0.011 0.084 0.177 0.188 




Table 1, continued 
 
Panel C: Main Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) above (below) the diagonal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1)  0.193 0.489 0.234 0.888 0.633 -0.005 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 0.025 0.023 0.034 0.004 -0.071 -0.040 -0.023 
(2) 0.213  0.082 0.017 0.196 0.143 0.030 0.022 0.037 -0.027 0.069 0.119 -0.021 0.038 0.167 0.085 0.087 
(3) 0.486 0.223  0.013 0.275 0.268 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.004 -0.066 -0.029 -0.008 
(4) 0.098 0.020 0.453  0.031 0.000 -0.017 0.009 0.006 0.020 -0.025 -0.031 0.009 -0.042 0.056 -0.017 -0.019 
(5) 0.016 0.061 0.183 0.078  0.442 -0.005 -0.013 -0.012 -0.024 0.027 0.028 0.036 0.007 -0.071 -0.042 -0.028 
(6) 0.414 0.216 0.892 0.269 0.063  -0.020 -0.027 -0.021 -0.018 0.020 0.012 0.003 0.022 -0.069 0.010 0.022 
(7) 0.423 0.097 0.586 0.335 0.058 0.426  0.161 0.103 0.005 0.113 0.216 -0.007 -0.015 -0.077 0.034 0.054 
(8) 0.529 0.128 0.051 -0.147 -0.191 0.064 -0.123  0.874 0.676 -0.629 -0.262 -0.460 -0.016 -0.040 -0.272 -0.128 
(9) 0.120 0.041 -0.012 -0.034 0.011 -0.013 -0.080 0.247  0.690 -0.693 -0.263 -0.489 -0.021 0.054 -0.206 -0.058 
(10) 0.090 0.043 -0.040 -0.050 0.022 -0.038 -0.081 0.150 0.786  -0.593 -0.334 -0.401 -0.008 0.009 -0.241 -0.106 
(11) 0.101 -0.027 -0.019 -0.011 0.063 -0.035 -0.056 0.061 0.652 0.603  0.873 0.524 0.084 0.137 0.348 0.255 
(12) -0.022 0.112 0.020 0.016 -0.059 0.038 0.010 0.152 -0.381 -0.402 -0.468  0.372 0.103 0.219 0.330 0.304 
(13) 0.029 0.137 0.018 0.012 -0.061 0.035 -0.019 0.240 -0.108 -0.064 -0.267 0.897  -0.055 -0.014 0.179 0.145 
(14) -0.114 -0.077 0.024 0.030 -0.037 0.039 0.016 -0.054 -0.274 -0.256 -0.292 0.267 0.199  0.074 0.008 0.020 
(15) 0.015 0.040 0.001 -0.004 -0.054 0.006 -0.005 0.062 0.121 0.076 0.049 0.130 0.166 -0.056  0.611 0.581 
(16) -0.048 0.173 -0.045 -0.055 0.086 -0.043 -0.078 -0.041 -0.026 0.152 0.028 0.188 0.252 -0.036 0.074  0.813 
(17) -0.083 0.087 -0.041 -0.015 0.000 -0.039 -0.001 0.016 -0.350 -0.221 -0.319 0.405 0.345 0.169 0.013 0.530  
Key 
 
               
(1) ROWNi,t-1 (10) NPLi,t        
(2) RLNANALYST1i,t-1  (11) ROAi,t        
(3) RIDEDOWNi,t-1  (12) CFROAi,t        
(4) RNIDEDOWNi,t-1  (13) ZSCOREi,t        
(5) RQIXOWNi,t-1  (14) GAPRATIOi,t        
(6) RTRAOWNi,t-1  (15) LOANSi,t        
(7) SIZEi,t  (16) LOANGROWTHi,t        
(8) COi,t  (17) DEPOSITGROWTHi,t       
(9) LLPi,t             
Italics indicate statistical significance at the 5% level or better, two tailed. 
            
 
This table reports the sample construction, basic descriptive statistics, and correlations for the main sample of BHCs from 1990-2011. To minimize the 
influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. Variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Predictability of Future Charge-offs 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5RLNANALYSTi,t-1  
+ 6LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + εi,t   (3) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample High Info Asymmetry Low Info Asymmetry 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
 
Intercept -0.0005 -1.21  0.0000 0.00  -0.0007 -1.29  
LLPi,t 0.2025 2.00 ** 0.0844 0.66  0.3012 2.28 ** 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0002 3.91 *** 0.0002 2.93 *** 0.0003 2.97 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1416 6.83 *** 0.1716 7.93 *** 0.0615 2.99 *** 
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0006 -3.19 *** -0.0008 -2.52 ** -0.0005 -1.65 * 
RLNANALYST i,t-1 0.0004 1.27  0.0006 1.65 * -0.0001 -0.14  
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0266 2.25 ** 0.0308 2.35 ** 0.0210 0.90  
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1131 2.68 *** 0.1425 2.41 ** 0.0953 0.91  
LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.0378 0.57  0.0407 0.57  0.0775 0.49  
          
N 6,899     2,760     2,757    
Adj R2 0.582   0.574   0.470   
          
High – Low    Coeff. t-stat     
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.0472 2.02 **    
LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1    -0.0368 -0.39     
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (3) using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to 
examine the impact of institutional ownership on high quality loan loss provisions that are more predictive 
of future charge-offs. The high (low) information asymmetry subsamples are formed by yearly ranking banks 
on the market-adjusted volatility of stock returns over the prior year. t-statistics are based on standard errors 
that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1 and RLNANALYSTi,t-1 
are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are 
winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
two-tailed, respectively. Variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Earnings Persistence and Predictability of Cash Flows 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 + 4RLNANALYSTi,t-1  + 5ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 +  
6ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + εi,t                 (4) 
Panel A: Earnings Persistence 
 Dependent Variable = ROAi,t+1 Dependent Variable = ROAi,t+2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample 
High Info  
Asymmetry 
Low Info  
Asymmetry Full sample High Info Asymmetry Low Info Asymmetry 














Intercept 0.0025 1.51  0.0035 1.76 * 0.0036 2.32 ** 0.0019 0.84  0.0013 0.40  0.0059 1.71 * 
ROAi,t 0.6571 8.21 *** 0.5942 6.10 *** 0.6653 8.53 *** 0.5540 5.49 *** 0.4480 3.10 *** 0.6020 2.88 *** 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0003 1.21  0.0261 1.08  -0.0204 
-
0.45  0.0008 2.46 ** 0.0847 2.45 ** -0.0199 
-
0.26  
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0014 -2.44 ** -0.0022 -2.28 ** 0.0007 0.36  -0.0002 
-
0.19  0.0005 0.37  0.0004 0.16  
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 -0.0014 -0.97  -0.0022 -1.61  0.0013 0.52  -0.0019 
-
1.42  -0.0025 
-
1.35  -0.0013 
-
0.59  
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 -0.0064 -0.50  -0.0071 -0.51  0.0152 0.91  -0.0214 
-
1.30  -0.0158 
-




ROWNi,t-1 0.1319 3.02 *** 0.2144 4.21 *** -0.0314 
-




RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.0719 1.05  0.0440 0.98  0.0008 0.01  0.0886 1.55  0.0363 0.45  0.1531 1.24  
                   
N 6,899    2,760     2,757    6,096    2,404    2,474    
Adj R2 0.446   0.440   0.429   0.189   0.160   0.230   
                   
High – Low    Coeff. t-stat        Coeff. 
t-
stat     
ROAi,t* 
ROWNi,t-1    0.2458 2.20 **       0.1262 0.87     
ROAi,t* 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1    0.0432 0.46        -0.1168 
-




Table 3, continued 
 
Panel B: Predictability of Cash Flows 
 Dependent Variable = CFROAi,t+1 Dependent Variable = CFROAi,t+2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample 
High Info  
Asymmetry 
Low Info  
Asymmetry Full sample High Info Asymmetry Low Info Asymmetry 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0026 1.30  0.0028 1.63  0.0066 2.51 ** 0.0039 2.17 ** 0.0041 1.77 * 0.0073 2.79 *** 
ROAi,t 0.6346 7.07 *** 0.6112 5.92 *** 0.4990 3.83 *** 0.4696 5.59 *** 0.3855 3.13 *** 0.4703 2.95 *** 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0012 4.59 *** 0.1288 6.14 *** 0.0206 0.47  0.0012 5.63 *** 0.1264 5.11 *** 0.0388 0.92  
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0012 -1.63  -0.0014 -2.16 ** -0.0005 -0.21  -0.0011 -1.44  -0.0006 -0.69  -0.0012 -0.65  
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.0014 2.77 *** 0.0010 1.32  0.0032 1.26  0.0006 0.87  0.0003 0.28  0.0011 0.67  
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 -0.0283 -2.07 ** -0.0311 -2.23 ** 0.0154 0.78  -0.0215 -1.72 * -0.0157 -1.02  0.0006 0.02  
ROAi,t* 
ROWNi,t-1 0.0812 2.33 ** 0.1162 4.74 *** 0.0220 0.18  0.0903 2.09 ** 0.1073 2.50 ** 0.0568 0.56  
ROAi,t* 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 -0.0067 -0.30  -0.0210 -0.66  -0.0732 -0.51  0.0330 0.98  0.0117 0.22  0.0426 0.46  
                   
N 6,899    2,760    2,757    6,095    2,403    2,474    
Adj R2 0.395   0.407   0.414   0.247   0.235   0.288   
                   
High – Low    Coeff. t-stat        Coeff. t-stat     
ROAi,t* 
ROWNi,t-1    0.0942 2.34 **       0.0505 0.46     
ROAi,t* 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1    0.0522 0.36        -0.0309 -0.30     
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (4) using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to examine the impact of institutional ownership 
on earnings persistence and cash flow predictability. The high (low) information asymmetry subsamples are formed by yearly ranking banks on the market-
adjusted volatility of stock returns over the prior year. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year 
(Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1 and RLNANALYSTi,t-1 are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Variables are 
as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4: Financial Reporting Quality – Lead, Current, and Lagged Institutional Ownership 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 7ROWNi,t +  
8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t + 9ROWNi,t+1 + 10LLPi,t*ROWNi,t+1 + εi,t                          (3c) 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 + 4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +  
6ROWNi,t + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t + 8ROWNi,t+1 + 9ROAi,t*ROWNi,t+1 + εi,t             (4c) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 4) (5) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+2 CFROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+2 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
 




Intercept -0.0008 -1.77 * 0.0022 1.66 * 0.0012 0.56  0.0026 1.32  0.0042 2.29 ** 
LLPi,t 0.2561 2.22 **             
SIZEi,t-1 0.0003 4.17 *** 0.0003 0.90  0.0007 2.17 ** 0.0013 4.65 *** 0.0012 5.46 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1524 7.74 ***             
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0009 -2.48 ** -0.0026 -3.78 *** -0.0012 -1.40  -0.0015 -2.22 ** -0.0017 -2.12 ** 
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0241 1.94 *             
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1680 1.81 *             
ROWNi,t 0.0004 0.83  0.0011 0.58  -0.0010 -0.64  0.0005 0.34  -0.0003 -0.38  
ROWNi,t+1 0.0002 0.41  0.0000 -0.01  0.0023 1.60  0.0002 0.19  0.0014 1.65 * 
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t -0.1446 -1.66 *             
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t+1 0.0411 0.60              
ROAi,t    0.6660 10.45 *** 0.5760 5.81 *** 0.6398 6.93 *** 0.4716 5.62 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0032 -0.25  -0.0187 -1.12  -0.0295 -2.09 ** -0.0195 -1.53  
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.1445 3.32 *** 0.0808 1.56  0.0876 2.47 ** 0.0898 2.04 ** 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t    0.0027 1.22  0.0000 0.00  0.0020 1.15  0.0000 0.01  
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t+1    -0.0016 -0.55  0.0041 0.77  -0.0005 -0.18  0.0023 0.63  
                
N 6,537    6,537    6,042    6,537    6,041    












Table 4, continued 
 
 
            
This table reports the results of modifying Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to provide 
evidence on the direction of causality between institutional ownership and financial reporting quality. Equations (3c) and (4c) control for the impact of 
the contemporaneous and future residual institutional ownership levels. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both 
bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1, ROWNi,t, and ROWNi,t+1 are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, 
all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 
Variables are as defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 5: Change in Financial Reporting Quality Prior to, Concurrent with, and After the Change in 
Institutional Ownership 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + εi,t                                 (3d) 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t                         (4d) 
Panel A: Predictability of Future Charge-offs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quintiles of  
change in 
 institutions’  
residual percentage 
 ownership 
Mean value of  
change in  
institutions’ residual  
percentage ownership  
from year t-1 to t 
Change in predictability of future 
 charge-offs in pre-ownership- 
change period (i.e., test of  
difference in 1 in Equation (2c) 
 from year t-2 to t-1) 
Change in predictability of  
future charge-offs during- 
ownership-change period (i.e.,  
test of difference in 1 in  
Equation (2c) from year t-1 to t) 
Change in predictability of  
future charge-offs in post- 
ownership-change period (i.e., 
 test of difference in 1 in  
Equation (2c) from year t to t+1) 
 ∆ROWNi,t-1 1,i,t-1 - 1,i,t-2 p-value  1,i,t - 1,i,t-1 p-value  1,i,t+1 - 1,i,t p-value  
Quintile 1 -9.51 -0.1504 0.113  0.1252 0.131  -0.0796 0.267  
Quintile 2 -3.12 -0.0749 0.227  0.1549 0.068 * -0.0071 0.927  
Quintile 3 -0.51 -0.0682 0.494  0.1735 0.091 * -0.0631 0.538  
Quintile 4 2.29 -0.0450 0.652  0.0460 0.490  0.0437 0.598  
Quintile 5 11.23 -0.0921 0.293  0.0270 0.697  0.1779 0.036 ** 





Table 5, continued 
 
Panel B: Earnings Persistence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quintiles of change in 
institutions’ residual 
percentage ownership 
Mean value of change 
in institutions’ residual 
percentage ownership 
from year t-1 to t 
Change in earnings persistence in 
pre-ownership-change period (i.e., 
test of difference in 1 in Equation 
(2c) from year t-2 to t-1) 
Change in earnings persistence 
during-ownership-change period 
(i.e., test of difference in 1 in 
Equation (2c) from year t-1 to t) 
Change in earnings persistence in 
post-ownership-change period 
(i.e., test of difference in 1 in 
Equation (2c) from year t to t+1) 
 ∆ROWNi,t-1 1,i,t-1 - 1,i,t-2 p-value  1,i,t - 1,i,t-1 p-value  1,i,t+1 - 1,i,t p-value  
Quintile 1 -9.51 -0.0777 0.877  -0.0008 0.994  -0.0982 0.108  
Quintile 2 -3.12 0.0402 0.641  0.1210 0.082 * -0.0442 0.541  
Quintile 3 -0.51 0.1241 0.112  -0.0101 0.889  -0.0433 0.583  
Quintile 4 2.29 0.1123 0.112  -0.1136 0.115  0.0352 0.616  
Quintile 5 11.23 -0.0934 0.207  -0.0561 0.356  0.1180 0.081 * 





Table 5, continued 
 
Panel C: Predictability of Cash Flows 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quintiles of change in 
institutions’ residual 
percentage ownership 
Mean value of change 
in institutions’ residual 
percentage ownership 
from year t-1 to t 
Change in predictability of cash 
flows in pre-ownership-change 
period (i.e., test of difference in 1 
in Equation (2c) from year t-2 to t-
1) 
Change in predictability of cash 
flows during-ownership-change 
period (i.e., test of difference in 1 
in Equation (2c) from year t-1 to 
t) 
Change in predictability of cash 
flows in post-ownership-change 
period (i.e., test of difference in 1 
in Equation (2c) from year t to t+1) 
 ∆ROWNi,t-1 1,i,t-1 - 1,i,t-2 p-value  1,i,t - 1,i,t-1 p-value  1,i,t+1 - 1,i,t p-value  
Quintile 1 -9.51 -0.0544 0.249  0.0115 0.749  -0.0381 0.360  
Quintile 2 -3.12 0.0626 0.306  0.0601 0.169  -0.0366 0.431  
Quintile 3 -0.51 0.0878 0.113  -0.0500 0.333  -0.0386 0.494  
Quintile 4 2.29 -0.0389 0.247  -0.0347 0.305  -0.0562 0.102  
Quintile 5 11.23 -0.0751 0.127  -0.0320 0.463  0.1100 0.002 *** 
Quintile 5 – Quintile 1 20.74 -0.0207 0.762  -0.0435 0.441  0.1481 0.007 *** 
 
 
            
This table reports the results of modifying Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to provide 
evidence on the direction of causality between institutional ownership and financial reporting quality. I sort bank-years into quintiles based on the change 
in institutions’ residual percentage ownership from year t-1 to t and then estimate Equations (3d) and (4d) for each quintile yearly from t-2, t-1, t, and t+1. 
This allows me to examine the change in accounting quality (earnings persistence, cash flow predictability or predictability of future charge-offs) in the 
pre-ownership change period (t-2 to t-1), during the ownership change period (t-1 to t) and post-ownership change period (t to t+1). The table then reports 
tests of the difference in the coefficient of interest in each quintile in each period. Panel A reports the results of modifying Equation (3) to estimate the 
change in predictability of future charge-offs. Panel B reports the results of modifying Equation (4) to estimate the change in earnings persistence. Panel 
C reports the results of modifying Equation (4) to estimate the change in the cash flow predictability. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Variables are 
as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 6: Financial Reporting Quality – Demand vs Anticipation 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-3 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-3 + εi,t                 (3e) 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-3 + 4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-3 +  
εi,t                            (4e) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 4) (5) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+2 CFROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+2 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
 




Intercept -0.0005 -1.18  0.000 -0.01  -0.0004 -0.15  0.0015 0.74  0.0024 1.18  
LLPi,t 0.2815 2.27 **             
SIZEi,t-1 0.0002 3.89 *** 0.005 2.24 ** 0.0009 2.79 *** 0.0014 5.34 *** 0.0014 6.66 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1360 6.89 ***             
ROWNi,t-3 0.0000 -0.66  -0.0010 -1.27  -0.0008 -0.63  -0.0006 -0.70  -0.0009 -0.87  
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0308 3.95 ***             
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-3 0.0199 1.76 *             
ROAi,t    0.7983 14.59 *** 0.6321 6.70 *** 0.6812 8.36 *** 0.5280 7.05 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0157 -1.68 * -0.0270 -1.76 * -0.0326 -2.74 *** -0.0264 -2.57 ** 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-3    0.1062 2.46 ** 0.1516 1.91 * 0.0733 1.70 * 0.1191 1.89 * 
                
N 5,264   5,264   4,605   5,264   4,605   
Adj R2 0.591   0.462   0.194   0.404   0.254   
 
            
This table reports the results of modifying Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to provide 
evidence on the direction of causality between institutional ownership and financial reporting quality. Equations (3e) and (4e) use the residual institutional 
ownership as of the start of two years prior to the current year to examine the impact on current year financial reporting. t-statistics are based on standard 
errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-3, is decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the 
influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-




Table 7: Financial Reporting Quality – Monitoring Institutions 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 5RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 6RQIXOWNi,t-1 +  
7RTRAOWNi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 9LLPi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
11LLPi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 12LLPi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1 + εi,t                                                                  (3f) 
ROAi,t+1(t+2) (CFROAi,t+1(t+2)) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 4RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
5RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 6RTRAOWNi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8ROAi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 +  
10ROAi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1 + 11ROAi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1 + εi,t                                                                      (4f) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 ROAi,t+2 CFROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+2 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
 




Intercept -0.0005 -0.83  0.0016 1.31  -0.0002 -0.08  0.0022 1.42  0.0026 1.26  
LLPi,t 0.2058 1.53              
ROAi,t    0.7339 9.88 *** 0.7027 7.50 *** 0.6676 8.84 *** 0.5576 6.30 *** 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0002 3.86 *** 0.0003 1.42  0.0008 2.94 *** 0.0012 5.07 *** 0.0013 6.40 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1388 6.93 ***             
RIDEDOWNi,t-1 -0.0005 -3.31 *** -0.0014 -2.46 ** -0.0018 -2.00 ** -0.0010 -1.24  -0.0014 -2.31 ** 
RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 0.0004 1.03  0.0013 0.96  0.0022 1.58  0.0015 2.16 ** 0.0023 2.13 ** 
RQIXOWNi,t-1 0.0000 -0.12  -0.0005 -1.02  -0.0003 -0.25  -0.0003 -0.69  -0.0003 -0.55  
RTRAOWNi,t-1 -0.0004 -2.00 ** -0.0008 -3.44 *** 0.0008 0.86  -0.0001 -0.26  0.0002 0.25  
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0277 2.57 **             
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0077 -0.66  -0.0256 -1.71 * -0.0295 -2.30 ** -0.0240 -2.03 ** 
LLPi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1 0.0672 2.67 ***             
LLPi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1 -0.0341 -0.30              
LLPi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1 0.0149 0.28              
LLPi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1 0.0974 1.37              
ROAi,t*RIDEDOWNi,t-1    0.1105 6.42 *** 0.1324 2.63 *** 0.0873 2.00 ** 0.1012 2.39 ** 
ROAi,t*RNIDEDOWNi,t-1    -0.1307 -1.44  -0.2115 -2.27 ** -0.0843 -1.67 * -0.1440 -2.29 ** 
ROAi,t*RQIXOWNi,t-1    0.0851 1.81 * 0.0939 1.59  0.0603 1.56  0.0687 1.54  
ROAi,t*RTRAOWNi,t-1    0.0197 0.49  -0.0615 -1.32  -0.0244 -1.00  -0.0236 -0.46  
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Table 7, continued 
 
N 6,899    6,899    6,096    6,899    6,095    
Adj R2 0.582   0.447   0.193   0.396   0.249   
 
 
            
This table reports the results of modifying Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to provide 
evidence on whether independent monitoring institutions are responsible for the positive relation between institutional ownership and financial reporting 
quality. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). RIDEDOWNi,t-1, RNIDEDOWNi,t-
1, RQIXOWNi,t-1, and RTRAOWNi,t-1 are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized 





Table 8: Financial Reporting Quality in the Financial Crisis 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 +  
6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 7CRISISi,t + 8LLPi,t*CRISISi,t + 9SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 
10NPLi,t*CRISISi,t + 11ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 12LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 
13LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + εi,t                                                    (3g) 
 
ROAi,t+1(CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 6CRISIS + 7ROAi,t*CRISISi,t + 
8SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 9ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 10ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t + 
11ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t + εi,t                        (4g) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+1 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
 
Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
 
Intercept -0.001 -1.09  0.002 1.51  0.005 3.02 *** 
LLPi,t 0.255 1.73 *       
SIZEi,t-1 0.000 3.24 *** 0.055 2.74 *** 0.109 3.61 *** 
NPLi,t 0.130 8.03 ***       
ROWNi,t-1 0.000 -2.23 ** -0.001 -1.75 * -0.002 -2.23 ** 
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.020 1.18        
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.052 2.90 ***       
CRISISi,t 0.000 -0.23  -0.023 -18.43 *** -0.021 -11.48 *** 
LLPi,t*CRISISi,t 0.450 2.51 **       
SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t 0.000 2.49 ** 0.001 2.32 ** 0.002 4.47 *** 
NPLi,t*CRISISi,t 0.073 2.81 ***       
ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t -0.001 -10.44 *** 0.003 1.60  0.005 2.74 *** 
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t -0.039 -2.22 **       
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t 0.297 6.89 ***       
ROAi,t    0.670 7.79 *** 0.550 6.49 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.010 -0.89  -0.020 -1.27  
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.097 2.35 ** 0.094 2.37 ** 
ROAi,t*CRISISi,t    0.380 1.31  0.367 1.48  
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1*CRISISi,t    -0.060 -1.77 * -0.062 -2.34 ** 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1*CRISISi,t    0.261 2.45 ** 0.013 0.13  
          
N 6,899   6,899   6,899   





Table 8, continued 
 
 
          
 
  
This table reports the results of estimating Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled 
OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to examine the impact of institutional ownership on financial reporting 
quality varied during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are 
adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1 is decile ranked yearly and scaled 
from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% 
levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Variables 
are as defined in the Appendix.
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Table 9: Changes in Institutional Ownership around Restatement Announcements –                     
Voting with their Feet 
Panel A: Total Institutional Ownership 
  Change over Quarters  
 Level at t = 0 -7 thru 0 
 
-7 thru -4 
 
-3 thru -2 
 
-1 thru 0 
 
1 thru 2 
 
3 thru 4 
 
5 thru 8 
 
1 thru 8 
 
Restaters 35.06% 5.31%  2.38%  0.35%  0.64%  0.69%  0.40%  0.15%  2.86% 
 
Matched 29.62% 4.11%  1.63%  0.62%  1.29%  0.47%  1.17%  1.79%  4.69% 
 
Difference  1.20%  0.75%  -0.27%  -0.65%  0.22%  -0.77% ** -1.64% ** -1.83% * 
t-stat  0.9  0.98  -0.7  -0.97  0.49  -1.85  -1.72  -1.48 
 
 
Panel B: Total Monitoring Ownership 
  Change over Quarters  
 Level at t = 0 -7 thru 0 
 
-7 thru -4 
 
-3 thru -2 
 
-1 thru 0 
 
1 thru 2 
 
3 thru 4 
 
5 thru 8 
 
1 thru 8 
 
Restaters 3.83% 0.63%  0.24%  0.15%  0.05%  0.17%  -0.06%  -0.89%  -0.93%  
Matched 3.39% 0.52%  0.16%  0.01%  0.17%  0.04%  -0.03%  0.00%  -0.26%  
Difference  0.11%  0.09%  0.14%  -0.13%  0.14%  -0.03%  -0.89% *** -0.67% * 
t-stat  0.28  0.35  1.33 * -0.61  1.11  -0.23  -2.54  -1.42  
 
Panel C: Total Non-Monitoring Ownership 
  Change over Quarters  
 Level at t = 0 -7 thru 0 
 
-7 thru -4 
 
-3 thru -2 
 
-1 thru 0 
 
1 thru 2 
 
3 thru 4 
 
5 thru 8 
 
1 thru 8 
 
Restaters 31.23% 4.21%  2.14%  0.17%  0.29%  0.95%  0.47%  1.19%  4.13%  
Matched 26.22% 3.55%  1.43%  0.58%  1.10%  0.47%  1.19%  1.70%  4.88%  
Difference  0.66%  0.71%  -0.41%  -0.82% * 0.49%  -0.72%  -0.51%  -0.75%  







Table 9, continued 
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating changes in raw institutional ownership in the quarters around the announcement of a restatement. The sample 
for this table includes 154 restatement announcements from 2000-2011. The quarter zero refers to the quarter in which a bank announces a restatement, 
with all other quarters numbered relative to it. Banks are matched to provide a benchmark to control for other changes that may impact institutional 
ownership based on size and stock returns over the year prior to the announcement (Parrino et al. 2003). Panel A presents the changes based on total 
institutional ownership. Panel B presents the changes solely for “monitoring” institutions as defined in the appendix. Panel C presents the changes for all 
other institutional owners. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, one-tailed, respectively.  
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Table 10: Additional Measures of Financial Reporting Quality 
Panel A: Earnings Management 
EMi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ATGROWTHi,t + 4LOANSi,t + 5NPLi,t +  
6LEVi,t + 7CFGROWTH i,t + εi,t                    (9) 
 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  
Intercept 0.1152 3.39 *** 
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0173 -2.15 ** 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0017 -0.91  
ATGROWTHi,t 0.0697 3.94 *** 
LOANSi,t -0.0985 -4.06 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1448 0.36  
LEVi,t -0.4170 -2.36 ** 
CFGROWTHi,t 5.8066 1.95 * 
    
N 5,702   
Adj R2 0.053   
 
Panel B: Benchmark Beating 
SMALLPOSi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ATGROWTHi,t + 4LOANSi,t +  
5NPLi,t + 6LEVi,t + 7CFGROWTHi,t + εi,t                            (10) 
 
Variable Coeff. z-stat  
Intercept -0.860 -4.02 *** 
ROWNi,t-1 -0.138 -2.15 ** 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.032 -1.66 * 
ATGROWTHi,t -0.617 -2.78 *** 
LOANSi,t 0.064 0.38  
NPLi,t -17.364 -4.42 *** 
LEVi,t -0.747 -0.72  
CFGROWTHi,t -12.47 -1.71 * 
    
N 6,898   
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating the impact of institutional ownership on alternative measures of 
financial reporting quality. Panel A reports the results of estimating Equation (9) using pooled OLS 
regressions to estimate the impact of institutional ownership on income increasing earnings management. 
Panel B reports the results of estimating Equation (10) using probit estimation to examine the impact of 
institutional ownership on the propensity to have a small positive earnings increase. t and z-statistics are 
based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1 
is decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are 
winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 




Table 11: Propensity to Issue Management Earnings Forecasts 
FORECASTi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3LOSSi,t + 4BMi,t +  
5EARNVOLATILITYi,t + εi,t                     (11) 
 
Variable Coeff. z-stat  
Intercept -4.125 -18.44 *** 
ROWNi,t-1 0.250 3.33 *** 
SIZEi,t-1 0.356 13.44 *** 
LOSSi,t -0.011 -0.05  
BMi,t-1 -0.953 -5.30 *** 
EARNVOLATILITYi,t -0.000 -4.25 *** 
    
N 6,899   
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (11) using probit estimation from 1990-2011 to examine 
the impact of institutional ownership on the propensity to issue management earnings forecasts. z-statistics 
are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). 
ROWNi,t-1 is decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 




Table 12: Auditors and Financial Reporting Quality 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5RLNANALYSTi,t-1  
       + 6BIGNi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +  
     9LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*BIGNi,t-1 + εi,t                                     (3h) 
 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 +  
     4RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 5BIGNi,t-1 + 6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +   
     8ROAi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*BIGNi,t-1 + εi,t                                   (4h) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+1 
Variable Coeff. t-stat 
 
Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
 
Intercept -0.0008 -1.20  0.0021 1.37  -0.0008 -0.43  
LLPi,t 0.1280 1.59        
SIZEi,t-1 0.0003 2.66 *** 0.0001 0.26  0.0015 6.51 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1335 5.21 ***           
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0007 -2.59 *** -0.0020 -15.84 *** -0.0011 -1.29  
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.0006 1.14  -0.0022 -0.94  0.0016 1.91 * 
BIGNi,t-1 -0.0009 -2.04 ** 0.0026 1.47  0.0003 0.19  
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0361 6.67 ***           
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1723 3.43 ***           
LLPi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1 0.0106 0.13            
LLPi,t*BIGNi,t-1 0.0296 1.24            
ROAi,t    0.7681 7.44 *** 0.7958 7.42 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0314 -1.81 * -0.0597 -4.40 *** 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.1676 4.82 *** 0.0975 3.13 *** 
ROAi,t*RLNANALYSTi,t-1    0.0896 0.80  -0.0119 -0.41  
ROAi,t*BIGNi,t-1    0.0629 1.22  0.0916 1.64  
          
N 3,594   3,594   3,594   
Adj R2 0.590   0.404   0.343   
 
 
          
 
  
This table reports the results of estimating modified Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, 
using pooled OLS regressions from 2000-2011 to examine the incremental impact of auditors and higher 
audit quality on financial reporting quality. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for 
clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1 and LNANALYST i,t-1 are decile ranked yearly 
and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% 
and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. 




Table 13: Financial Reporting Quality and Bank Risk 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 6LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + εi,t           (3) 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 + 4ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 5ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + εi,t   (4) 
 Dependent Variable 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 High Low High Low High Low 








Intercept 0.0006 0.97  -0.0004 -0.67  0.0012 0.55  -0.0006 -0.18  0.0025 1.08  0.0009 0.23  
LLPi,t 0.0008 0.01  0.3855 2.95 ***             
SIZEi,t-1 0.0002 2.15 ** 0.0002 2.67 *** 0.0003 1.14  0.0003 0.72  0.0013 5.02 *** 0.0010 1.66 * 
NPLi,t 0.1753 8.38 *** 0.0456 3.00 ***             
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0008 -3.03 *** -0.0001 -0.41  -0.0025 -2.54 ** 0.0026 2.16 ** -0.0010 -1.11  0.0005 0.48  
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0439 3.06 *** 0.0227 1.77 *             
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.2004 4.03 *** 0.0173 0.25              
ROAi,t       0.6044 7.83 *** 0.9187 4.31 *** 0.5833 6.52 *** 0.8587 3.94 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1       -0.0016 -0.13  -0.0079 -0.30  -0.0250 -1.97 ** -0.0262 -0.82  
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1       0.1951 3.09 *** -0.1200 -1.76 * 0.0670 1.64 * -0.0087 -0.13  
                   
N  2,640     2,643     2,640     2,643     2,640     2,643    
Adj R2 0.585   0.511   0.400   0.557   0.355   0.491   
                   
High – Low Coeff. t-stat     Coeff. t-stat     Coeff. t-stat     
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1831 2.04 **                








Table 13, continued 
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating Equations (3) and (4) using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 to examine the impact of bank risk and 
credit losses on the demand for financial reporting quality. The high (low) risk subsamples are formed by yearly ranking banks on the ex-ante bank risk 
at the start of the year. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWN i,t-1 is 
decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 14: Bank Risk and Credit Losses 
Panel A: Ex-Ante Bank Risk 
ZSCOREi,t = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2NPLi,t + 3SIZEi,t-1 + 4GAPRATIOi,t +  
5LOANSi,t + 6LOANGROWTHi,t + 7DEPOSITGROWTHi,t + εi,t         (12) 
 
 Levels Specification Changes Specification 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
 
Intercept 3.3651 16.33 *** 0.0098 0.17  
ROWNi,t-1  0.1966 2.18 ** 0.1110 1.95 * 
NPLi,t -42.0015 -6.73 *** -35.5655 -5.12 *** 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0204 -1.31  -0.3687 -0.86  
GAPRATIOi,t -0.5196 -3.35 *** 0.0817 0.81  
LOANSi,t -0.4796 -2.45 *** 1.4449 2.21 ** 
LOANGROWTHi,t 0.5095 2.73 *** -0.2935 -1.59  
DEPOSITGROWTHi,t 0.8788 3.97 *** 0.1204 0.80  
       
N 6,896    6,032   





Table 14, continued 
 
Panel B: Ex-Post Credit Losses 
NPLi,t+1 = 0 + 1ROWNi,t-1 + 2NPLi,t + 3SIZEi,t-1 + 4LOANGROWTHi,t +  
5DEPOSITGROWTHi,t + εi,t                                (13) 
 
 Levels Specification Changes Specification 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
 
Intercept 0.0035 2.91 *** 0.0008 0.76  
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0008 -2.32 ** -0.0007 -2.02 ** 
NPLi,t  0.8979 12.83 *** 0.1167 0.79  
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0001 -0.96  0.0022 1.03  
LOANGROWTHi,t 0.0022 0.62  -0.0021 -1.02  
DEPOSITGROWTHi,t -0.0062 -1.64  -0.0014 -0.50  
       
N 6,889    6,032   
Adj R2 0.622   0.024   
 
 
            
This table reports the results of using pooled OLS from 1990-2011 to examine the impact of institutional 
ownership on ex-ante bank risk and ex-post realized credit losses. Panel A reports the results of estimating 
ex-ante bank risk. Column (1) estimates Equation (12) and Column (2) estimates a changes specification of 
Equation (12) by first-differencing all variables. Panel B reports the results of estimating ex-post credit losses. 
Column (1) estimates Equation (13) and Column (2) estimates a changes specification of Equation (13) by 
first-differencing all variables. t-statistics are based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering by both 
bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1, and ∆ROWNi,t are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To 
minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** 





Table A1: Estimation of Residual Institutional Ownership 
OWNi,t = 0 + 1BMi,t-1 + 2SIZEi,t + 3VOLATILITYi,t + 4TURNOVERi,t  
          + 5STOCKPRICEi,t + 6SP500i,t + 7MOMENTUM3i,t  
       + 8MOMENTUM12i,t + 9AGEi,t + 10YIELDi,t-1 + εi,t                       (1) 
 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  
[+ significant,  
- significant] 
Intercept -0.272 -11.44 *** [0, 22] 
BMi,t-1 0.017 3.24 *** [2, 1] 
SIZEi,t 0.055 10.71 *** [22, 0] 
VOLATILITYi,t -0.985 -1.74 * [0, 3] 
TURNOVERi,t 0.984 7.50 *** [20, 0] 
STOCKPRICEi,t 0.001 8.12 *** [8, 0] 
SP500i,t -0.093 -4.00 *** [0, 11] 
MOMENTUM3i,t 0.037 2.27 ** [4, 0] 
MOMENTUM12i,t 0.017 1.33  [5, 0] 
AGEi,t 0.002 8.39 *** [11, 0] 
YIELDi,t-1 -1.004 -4.44 *** [0, 9] 
     
N 22    
Adj R2 0.467    
 
 
            
This table reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using annual cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth 
regressions from 1990-2011 of ownership by different types of institutions on the economic determinants of 
their investments. While Equation (1) is estimated separately for total institutional ownership and institutional 
ownership by type of institution, for brevity only the results for OWNi,t are tabulated here. Consistent with 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), the table reports the average coefficient estimates and the number of yearly 
significant positive and negative coefficients at the 5% level in addition to the Fama-MacBeth test statistic. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively. Variables are as 




Table A2: Financial Reporting Quality – Analyst Type 
Panel A: Analyst Sophistication 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 +  
     6RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 
     9LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + εi,t                               (3a) 
 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 + 4RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 +  
     5LNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + 6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +   
     8ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 + εi,t                              (4a) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+1 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  
Intercept -0.0009 -1.75 * 0.0036 1.71 * 0.0043 2.26 ** 
LLPi,t 0.2488 2.23 **       
SIZEi,t-1 0.0003 3.89 *** 0.0002 0.83  0.0011 4.16 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1406 6.57 ***       
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0007 -3.32 *** -0.0016 -2.53 ** -0.0012 -1.51  
RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 0.0004 2.24 ** -0.0007 -0.44  0.0011 1.54  
RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 0.0006 1.88 * -0.0016 -1.81 * -0.0018 -2.11 ** 
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0253 2.07 **       
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1232 2.80 ***       
LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 -0.0265 -0.76        
LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 -0.0122 -0.22        
ROAi,t    0.6062 5.94 *** 0.5337 6.39 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0029 -0.21  -0.0232 -1.74 * 
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.1411 3.00 *** 0.0811 2.04 ** 
ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1    0.0867 1.23  0.1224 1.71 * 
ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1    0.0291 0.35  0.0005 0.01  
          
N 6,899   6,899   6,899   




Table A2, continued 
 
Panel B: Analyst Independence 
COi,t+1 = 0 + 1LLPi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3NPLi,t + 4ROWNi,t-1 + 5RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 +  
     6RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + 7LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 8LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 + 
     9LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 + 10LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + εi,t                                           (3b) 
 
ROAi,t+1 (CFROAi,t+1) = 0 + 1ROAi,t + 2SIZEi,t-1 + 3ROWNi,t-1 + 4RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 +  
     5LNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + 6ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1 + 7ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1 +   
     8ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 + 9ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 + εi,t                                          (4b) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 COi,t+1 ROAi,t+1 CFROAi,t+1 
Variable Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  
Intercept -0.0009 -1.64  0.0045 2.07 ** 0.0043 2.07 ** 
LLPi,t 0.2241 2.36 **       
SIZEi,t-1 0.0003 3.84 *** 0.0005 1.83 * 0.0011 4.01 *** 
NPLi,t 0.1398 6.73 ***       
ROWNi,t-1 -0.0007 -2.93 *** -0.0001 -0.10  -0.0010 -1.36  
RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 0.0005 1.79 * -0.0034 -3.42 *** -0.0016 -2.77 *** 
RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 0.0003 1.28  -0.0004 -0.33  0.0013 2.38 ** 
LLPi,t*SIZEi,t-1 0.0256 2.23 **       
LLPi,t*ROWNi,t-1 0.1185 2.28 **       
LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 0.0046 0.10        
LLPi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 0.0073 0.11        
ROAi,t    0.4754 4.52 *** 0.5351 5.51 *** 
ROAi,t*SIZEi,t-1    -0.0122 -0.81  -0.0208 -1.55  
ROAi,t*ROWNi,t-1    0.0795 1.72 * 0.0716 2.02 ** 
ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1    -0.0019 -0.03  -0.0006 -0.02  
ROAi,t*RLNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1    0.1087 1.77 * 0.0902 1.34  
          
N 6,899   6,899   6,899   
Adj R2 0.582   0.444   0.396   
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Table A2, continued 
 
 
          
 
  
This table reports the results of estimating modified Equations (3) and (4) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, using pooled OLS regressions from 1990-2011 
to examine possible reasons for the non-result on average of analyst following reported in Tables 2 and 3. Panel A reports the results splitting analyst 
following based on analyst sophistication. Panel B reports the results splitting analyst following based on analyst independence. t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on both bank and year (Petersen, 2009). ROWNi,t-1, LNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1, 
LNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1, LNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1, LNANALYST_NONINDEPi,t-1 are decile ranked yearly and scaled from [0,1]. To 
minimize the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized yearly at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 





Appendix: Variable Definitions 
AGEi,t Natural logarithm of bank age calculated as the 
number of years bank i has been listed on CRSP 
at of the end of year t. 
ANALYSTi,t-1 Raw number of analysts issuing an earnings 
forecast for bank i in year t-1. 
ATi,t Total assets of bank i at the end of year t. 
ATGROWTHi,t Change in assets in bank i from the beginning to 
the end of year t scaled by assets as of the 
beginning of year t. 
BIGNi,t-1 Auditor dummy variable equal to one if the 
auditor for bank i in year t-1 is a Big N auditor 
and set to zero otherwise. 
BMi,t Book to market ratio of bank i at the end of year 
t calculated as the book value of the total 
common equity divided by the market value of 
common equity (stock price multiplied by 
common shares outstanding). 
CFGROWTHi,t Change in total cash flows in bank i from the 
beginning to the end of year t, where cash flows 
are calculated as pre-tax net income before 
extraordinary items plus the loan loss provision, 
scaled by assets as of the beginning of year t. 
CFROAi,t Cash return on assets calculated as pre-tax net 
income before extraordinary items plus the loan 
loss provision of bank i in year t scaled by total 
assets as of the beginning of year t. 
COi,t Total loan charge-offs of bank i in year t scaled 
by total assets as of the beginning of year t. 
CRISISi,t Crisis dummy variable equal to one if the year is 
2007 or 2008 and set to zero otherwise. 
DEPOSITGROWTHi,t Percentage growth in total deposits of bank i 
from the beginning to the end of year t. 
DLOANLOSSi,t Discretionary loan loss provision of bank i in 
year t scaled by assets as of the beginning of year 
t. 
EARNVOLATILITYi,t Standard deviation of three years of income 
before taxes and extraordinary items ending in 
the current period. 
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EMi,t Total signed earnings management for bank i in 
year t scaled by assets as of the beginning of year 
t. 
FORECASTi,t Forecast dummy variable equal to one if the 
bank issued any quarterly or annual earnings 
forecasts during the fiscal period and set to zero 
otherwise. 
GAPRATIOi,t Absolute net rate sensitive assets of bank i at the 
end of year t scaled by total assets as of the 
beginning of year t. Net rate sensitive assets are 
calculated as the difference between assets and 
liabilities that are due to mature or be repriced 
within one year. 
GROSSLOANi,t Total gross loans of bank i as of the end of year 
t. 
IDEDOWNi,t-1 Raw percentage ownership of bank i at the end 
of year t-1 for all institutional investors classified 
as both “dedicated” by Bushee (2001) and 
“independent” by Brickley et al. (1998). 
LEVi,t Total equity in bank i at the end of year t scaled 
by total assets as of the end of year t. 
LLPi,t Loan loss provisions of bank i in year t scaled by 
total assets as of the beginning of year t. 
LLRi,t Loan loss reserve of bank i in year t scaled by 
gross loans as of the beginning of year t. 
LNANALYSTi,t-1 Raw natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
analysts issuing an earnings forecast for bank i 
in year t-1. 
LOAN_AGi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are agricultural loans. 
LOAN_COMi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are commercial and industrial 
loans. 
LOAN_CONi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are other consumer loans. 
LOAN_DEPi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are depository institution loans. 
LOAN_FOREIGNi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are foreign government loans. 
LOAN_REi,t Percentage of total gross loans of bank i at the 
end of year t that are real estate loans. 
LOANGROWTHi,t Percentage growth in total gross loans of bank i 
from the beginning to the end of year t. 
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LOANLOSSi,t Loan loss provision of bank i in year t scaled by 
average gross loans as of the beginning and end 
of year t. 
LOANSi,t Total gross loans of bank i at the end of year t 
scaled by total assets as of the beginning of year 
t. 
LOSSi,t Current period loss dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm reported losses before taxes and 
extraordinary items in the current period and set 
to zero otherwise. 
MOMENTUM12i,t Total gross buy and hold stock return of bank i 
during the nine month period beginning at the 
start of year t and ending three months prior to 
the end of year t. 
MOMENTUM3i,t Total gross buy and hold stock return of bank i 
during the last three months of year t. 
NIDEDOWNi,t-1 Raw percentage ownership of bank i at the end 
of year t-1 for all institutional investors classified 
as both “dedicated” by Bushee (2001) and “non-
independent” by Brickley et al. (1998). 
NPLi,t Total non-performing loans of bank i at the end 
of year t scaled by total assets as of the beginning 
of year t. Non-performing loans are loans that are 
in nonaccrual status (e.g., 90 or more days past 
due and not sufficiently collateralized, payment 
in full is not expected, or maintained on a cash 
basis because of deterioration in financial 
condition of borrower) or have been 
restructured. 
OWNi,t-1 Raw percentage ownership of bank i at the end 
of year t-1 for all institutional investors.  
QIXOWNi,t-1 Raw percentage ownership of bank i at the end 
of year t-1 for all institutional investors classified 
as “quasi-indexers” by Bushee (2001). 
RLNANALYSTi,t-1 Residual natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of analysts issuing an earnings forecast 
for bank i in year t-1. 
RLNANALYST_ALLSTARi,t-1 Residual natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of all-star analysts issuing an earnings 
forecast for bank i in year t-1 as identified by the 
Institutional Investor magazine. 
RLNANALYST_INDEPi,t-1 Residual natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of independent analysts issuing an 
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earnings forecast for bank i in year t-1 measured 
as the total analyst following less the number of 
analysts issuing an earnings forecast for bank i 
that are employed by a firm that has underwritten 
a debt or equity issuance for bank i listed in SDC 
Platinum within the past three years. 
RLNANALYST_NONALLSTARi,t-1 Residual natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of non-all-star analysts issuing an 
earnings forecast for bank i in year t-1 measured 
as the total analyst following less the number of 
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